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FAME, THE FOUNDING, AND THE POWER TO
DECLARE WAR
William Michael Treano4t
Almost without discussion, and essentially without opposition, the
Framers and Ratifiers of the United States Constitution vested in Congress the "Power ...To declare War, [and] grant Letters of Marque
and Reprisal."' During the past fifty years, one of the fiercest controversies in constitutional law has concerned what the Founders meant
by this grant. It is a debate that has had, and that continues to have,
dramatic importance. When Presidents committed troops or prepared to commit troops in Korea, Vietnam, Grenada, Panama, Iraq,

Somalia, Haiti, and, most recently, Bosnia, they claimed that the Constitution did not require them to seek explicit congressional approval
for their actions. In each instance, critics proclaimed the Presidents'
actions unconstitutional. 2 When Congress sought to control presidential warmaking by passing the War Powers Act of 1973,3 defenders of
the statute declared that it simply tracked the War Powers Clause.
Presidents, however, have repeatedly claimed that the statute violates
the Constitution, because they believe the War Powers Clause grants
Congress only limited powers. 4 The same question has been at issue
on each occasion: Does the Constitution give Congress alone the
power to initiate conflict?
t Associate Professor, Fordham Law School. BA., Yale, 1979; A.M., Harvard, 1982;
J.D., Yale, 1985. In writing this Article, I accumulated substantial intellectual debts. I particularly thank Tom Alpert, Akhil Amar, Mary Sarah Bilder, Victor Brudney, Bill Casto,
Bryce Denno, Debby Denno, Christine Desan, Neil Devins, Jill Fisch, Terry Fisher, Martin
Flaherty, Jim Fleming, Abner Greene, Tracy Higgins, Morton Horwitz, Jim Kainen, Laura
Kalman, John McGinnis, Greg Mark, JudgeJohn Noonan, Jack Rakove, John Phillip Reid,
Dan Richman, Howard Shapiro, Terry Smith, Gene Sperling, Lloyd Weinreb, John Yoo,
and Ben Zipursky. Earlier versions of this Article were presented at the Harvard Law
School legal history speakers' program; at the annual meeting of the Pacific Coast branch
of the American Historical Association; and at a Fordham faculty colloquium. I am grateful to the participants in those sessions for their observations. Delon Abrams, Sean Hayes,
Michael Roll, David Roth, and Caroline Sorokoff provided superb research assistance. The
Library of Congress graciously made available its collections, and Fordham Law School
generously provided research assistance.
11.
1
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
2 These controversies concerning presidential warmaking are discussed infra Part
IA
3 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-48 (1994).
4 For a discussion of the debate concerning the War Powers Resolution, see infra Part
IA
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The roster of scholars engaged in the controversy over the original understanding of the warmaking power reads like a who's who of
constitutional scholars and scholars of foreign affairs. 5 On one side of
the debate-the pro-Congress side-are such academics as Raoul Berger, 6 Alexander Bickel, 7 John Hart Ely, 8 Louis Fisher,9 Harold Koh, 10
Leonard Levy, 1I Charles Lofgren, 12 Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.,13 and William Van Alstyne. 14 They have argued that the original understanding
5 This Article approaches the question of original understanding from two perspectives. First, in light of the ongoing academic and political debate about the original understanding of the War Powers Clause-a debate in which the relevance of the original
understanding is often treated as a given-the Article re-examines the question of what the
Founders intended. Second, wholly apart from whether the original understanding is
binding as a matter of constitutional law, the Article asks whether the original understanding of the War Powers Clause is sensible in today's world, and whether we can learn anything from the Founders' concerns. For further discussion, see infra Part IV. The
underlying jurisprudential question of the extent to which the original understanding
binds modem interpretations of the Constitution is discussed in these contexts, but it is
not a separate focus of the Article. The discussion of the significance of original intent
builds on and synthesizes earlier writings of mine discussing some particular part of the
original understanding question. See William Michael Treanor, The Case of the Prisoners
and the Origins of Judicial Review, 143 U. PA. L. R'.v. 491, 544-56 (1994) [hereinafter
Treanor, JudicialReview] (describing significance of original understanding to Founders in
construing Constitution); William M. Treanor, The Original Understandingof the Takings
Clause and the PoliticalProcess, 95 COLUM. L. REiv. 782, 855-80 (1995) [hereinafter Treanor,
Takings Clause] (arguing for translation model of original understanding); William M.
Treanor, Taking the FramersSeriously, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1016, 1023-40 (1988) [hereinafter
Treanor, Framers] (book review) (explaining the relevance of Founders' worldview); William M. Treanor & Gene B. Sperling, Prospective Overruling and the Revival of "Unconstitutional" Statutes, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 1902, 1942-43 (1993) (analyzing original understanding
and changing constitutional meaning).
6 See Raoul Berger, War-Making by the President, 121 U. PA. L REv. 29 (1972).
7 See Alexander M. Bickel, Congress, the President and the Power to Wage War, 48 CHI.KENT L. Ruv. 131 (1971).
8

SeeJOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY. CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM

AND ITS AFTERMATH 3-10,

9
10

139-52 (1993).

See Louis FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER (1995).
See HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER

AFTER THE IRAN-CoNTRA AFFAIR 74-77 (1990).
11
See LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS' CONSTITUTION 30-53

(1988).
12 See Charles A. Lofgren, On War-Making, OriginalIntent, and Ultra-Whiggery, 21 VAL.
U. L. Rv. 53 (1986); Charles A. Lofgren, War-Making Under the Constitution: The Original
Understanding,81 YALE L.J. 672 (1972) [hereinafter Lofgren, Understanding].
13
See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 1-26 (1973).
14 See William Van Alstyne, Congress, the President, and the Power to Declare War: A Requiem for Vietnam, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1972). For other leading accounts that are similar
in approach to those mentioned in the text, see EDWARD KEYNES, UNDECLARED WAR: TWILIGHT ZONE OF CONSTITUTIONAL POWER 31-40 (1982); W. TAYLOR REVELEY III, WAR POWERS
OF THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS: WHO HOLDS THE ARROWS AND OLIVE BRANCH? 50-115
(1981); ABRAHAM D. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: THE ORIGINS 25-38 (1976); FRANCIS D. WORMUTH ET AL., To CHAIN THE DOG OF WAR: THE WAR

POWER OF CONGRESS IN HISTORY AND LAW 17-28 (1986); Arthur Bestor, Separation of Powers
in the Domain of Foreign Affairs: The Intent of the Constitution HistoricallyExamined, 5 SETON
HALL L REx'. 527, 555-613 (1974); Francis L. Coolidge, Jr. &Joel David Sharrow, The War-
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was that, except for a limited power to repel sudden attacks, the President could not commit troops to combat without congressional authorization. They believe that modern constitutional law should

reflect that understanding. In contrast, other scholars have adopted a

16
pro-Executive stance. These include Phillip Bobbitt, 15 Robert Bork,
Edward Corwin, 17 Henry Monaghan, 18 Eugene Rostow,19 Robert Turner,20 W. Michael Reisman, 21 and John Yoo,22 among others.2 3 The
pro-Executive scholars have argued either that the power to declare

war was intended to be a very limited power-conferring on Congress
the power to classify a conflict as a war for purposes of international
law24 (rather than conferring on it the exclusive power to initiate conMakingPowers: The Intentions of the Framersin the Light ofParliamentaryHistory, 50 B.U. L. REv.
5 (special issue) (Spring, 1970); Note, Congress, thePresident,and thePowerto Commit Forces to
Combat, 81 HARv. L. RE%,. 1771 (1968).
15 See Philip Bobbitt, War Powers: An Essay on John Hart Ely's War and Responsibility:
ConstitutionalLessons of Vietnam and its Aftermath, 92 MICH. L. RE,. 1364, 1370-1388 (1994)
(book review).
16 See Robert Bork, Foreword to THE FETTERED PRESIDENCY. LEGAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE
ExEcUtrVE BRANCH at ix (L. Gordon Crovitz &Jeremy A. Rabkin eds., 1989) [hereinafter

Bork, Foreword]; Robert Bork, Erosion of the President'sPower in Foreign Affairs, 68 WASH. U.
L.Q. 693, 698 (1990) [hereinafter Bork, Erosion].
17 See EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787-1984, at 234, 256
(5th ed. rev. 1984).
18 See Henry P. Monaghan, PresidentialWar-making, 50 B.U. L. Rv. 19 (special issue)
(Spring, 1970).
19 See Eugene V. Rostow, Great Cases Make Bad Law: The War Powers Act, 50 TEx. L. REv.
833, 864-66 (1972) [hereinafter Rostow, Great Cases]; Eugene V. Rostow, "Once More unto the

Breach:" The War Powers Resolution Revisited, 21 VAL. U. L. REv. 1, 6 (1986) [hereinafter
Rostow, Once More].
20

See ROBERT F. TURNER, REPEALING THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION:

.STORING THE

RuLE OF LAW IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 80-81 (1991).

21

See W. Michael Reisman, Some Lessonsfrom Iraq: InternationalLaw and DemocraticPoli-

tics, 16 YALEJ. INT'L L. 203, 212 (1991).

22 SeeJohn C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of War Powers, 84 CAL. L. Rv'. 167 (1996).
23

See, e.g.,John Lehman, MakingWar: The 200-year-old Battle Between the President

and Congress Over How America Goes to War 60 (1992); ANN VAN WYNEN THOMTAS &
AARON J. THOMAS, THE WAR-MAKING POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT: CONSTITUTIONAL. AND INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS 8 (1982); Department of State, Office of the Legal Adviser, The

Legality of United States Participationin the Defense of Viet Nam, 75 YALE LJ. 1085, 1101 (1966)
[hereinafter Office of the Legal Adviser]; J. Terry Emerson, The War Powers Resolution
Tested: The President's Independent Defense Power, 51 NOTRE DA.Mi" LAw. 187, 204-13 (1975)

[hereinafter Emerson, War Powers Resolution];J. Terry Emerson, War Powers Legislation, 74
W. VA. L. REv. 53, 72 (1971) [hereinafter Emerson, War Powers Legislation]; Patrick 0.
Gudridge, Ely, Black, Grotius and Vattel, 50 U. MIAMI L REv. 81 (1995); Patrick D. Robbins,

The War Powers Resolution After Fifteen Years: A Reassessmen 38 AM. U. L. REv. 141, 146-50
(1988); William P. Rogers, Congress, the President, and the War Powers, 59 CAL. L. REV. 1194

(1971); Lee A. Casey & David B. Rivkin,Jr., In ConstitutionalInterpretation,Read the Framers'
Words, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 3, 1994, at 24.
24

See, e.g., Bobbitt, supranote 15, at 1375; Emerson, War Powers Resolution, supra note

23, at 211-13; Rostow, Once More, supranote 19, at 6; Yoo, supra note 22, at 295.
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flict)-or that, for reasons unique to the War Powers Clause, original
understanding is irrelevant to resolution of modem controversies.2 5
The debate has reached a point of stalemate. As Professor Stephen Carter concluded, "[E]vidence concerning the original under26
standing ... does not come down firmly on one side or the other."

Although the evidence is limited-with the critical part of the constitutional debates consisting of little more than a page of the published
record 2 7 and subject to various plausible readings-this is not the
principal cause of the stalemate concerning the original understanding. Rather, the problem is that neither side is able to square its
claims fully with the evidence that exists. To the extent that the Founders made statements about the war power, those statements support
the view that Congress alone has the power to initiate conflict. 28 But
pro-Executive scholars can plausibly counter that historical context
strongly supports their position. The phrase "declare war" had a fixed
meaning in international law; it did not mean to start war, but rather
to classify a conflict as a war for legal purposes. Accordingly, precedent in England and in this country suggests a "shared understanding"2 9 that the Executive could start wars. To put it simply, the proExecutive position is that pro-Congress scholars have failed to explain
why the Founders would have taken from the Executive the power to
declare war. Given that failure, pro-Executive scholars argue that the
intent of the great majority of the Founders to have the President possess the power to start war must be given effect, regardless of the belief
of a handful of individuals that Congress alone has that power.
There is, finally, one bit of evidence that neither side has explained convincingly. Numerous contemporaneous statements indicate that the decision to declare war was purely a congressional
matter, which means that the President could not veto declarations of
war.a0 This absence of a veto seems inconsistent with the view of proCongress scholars that the Founders sought to slow the path to war as
much as possible. Yet it is also inconsistent with the pro-Executive
view that the Founders were supportive of presidential involvement
(and, generally, control) in all war matters.
25 See, e.g., Bork, Erosion, supra note 16, at 698; Bork, Foreword, supra note 16, at x;
Reisman, supra note 21, at 212; Rostow, Once More, supra note 19, at 48.
26 Stephen L. Carter, The Constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution, 70 VA. L. REv.
101, 111 (1984). See also Bobbitt, supra note 15, at 1374 ("[U]nlike other constitutional

disputes, the partisans [of competing positions on the clause] appear to find each of their
own points decisive and dispute the validity of all of their opponents' claims ....").
27

See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 318-19 (Max Farrand

ed., rev. ed. 1986) [hereinafter Farrand].
28 For discussion of the relevant statements, see infra Part I.C.
29 Yoo, supra note 22, at 263.
30 See infra text accompanying notes 181-201.
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This Article breaks the stalemate by advancing an explanation for
why the Founders would have wanted Congress alone to have the
power to start war, the question that pro-Congress scholars have been
unable to answer. In offering that explanation, the Article takes a different approach than previous work, which has, in accordance with
the normal conventions of legal and constitutional scholarship, explored the original understanding by focusing on what the Founders
said about the allocation of the war power, the constitutional structure, the language used, and prior practice. Although this Article uses
evidence of this type, it also seeks to employ the approaches of intellectual history, probing the structure of the founding generation's
thoughts and the often implicit values that underlie the choices they
made.3 1 In pursuing this project, it will look not merely at the traditional sources directly concerning original understanding, but, more
generally, at how political leaders in the early republic talked about
war, government, and individual motivation.
This analysis brings to the forefront a subject of critical importance to the Framers as they created the Constitution, but one which
constitutional law scholars have essentially ignored: the individual's
desire to achieve immortal fame. Although the subject of the Framers' views of fame (using the term in the eighteenth century sense of
one whom posterity will remember as great) has yet to receive close,
sustained study, a number of historians, and in particular the late
Douglass Adair, have shown how the Framers' actions and their political theory reflected their hope of achieving lasting renown. The
Framers had, in Adair's words, "an almost obsessive desire for
fame" 2-and they believed that such a desire was a widely-shared
31
Thus, there is a greater emphasis here on context and ideology than there is in
standard legal history analyses of original understanding. My approach starts with the
premise that, in determining who the founding generation thought should have the power
to start war, it is helpful to look at their general views about war and human personality,
rather than focusing exclusively on what they explicitly said about allocation of the
warmaking power. This broader approach is particularly helpful here because the traditional sources are so slight. The difference between an historian's approach to interpretive
questions and the approach traditionally used by legal scholars is incisively probed in

LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEcAL LIBERALISM 167-236 (1996), and Martin S.

Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE LJ. 1725, 1745-55 (1996). It should be
noted, however, that when historians have turned to questions of legal history, they have
generally applied the approach of legal scholars, rather than that of intellectual historians.
That is, they have devoted relatively little attention to ideology and context. The treatment
of the original understanding of the War Powers Clause by Professor Lofgren, who is an
historian, is an example of this practice. Although Lofgren's work is the most convincing
treatment of the subject to date, it is still limited by the fact that it looks almost exclusively
at the types of sources on which lawyers focus, such as statements about the War Powers
Clause made at the constitutional convention and at the state ratifying conventions, English precedent, and early practice. See Lofgren, Understanding,supra note 12.
32

DoucLAss ADAIR, Fameand theFoundingFathers,in FAME AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS

3, 7 (Trevor Colbourn ed., 1974).
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trait. But these historians have not attempted to show the relationship
between the Founders' view of fame and the constitutional structure
that they created. Similarly, constitutional scholars have not examined the subject, either with respect to the War Powers Clause or
the document as a whole. They have thus wholly ignored the way in
which the Framers' ideas about fame shaped the Constitution, a disregard which seriously distorts our perception of the original understanding. Piecing together sometimes implicit views, the Article
argues that the allocation of the war power reflected the Framers' understanding of the desire for fame. The founding generation believed
that, if the President could commit the nation to war, his desire for
fame might lead him into war even when war was not in the national
interest. 3 3 By contrast, however, individual members of Congress
would not win fame if the nation went to war and won. Therefore,
Congress alone could be trusted to decide questions of war correctly.
Animated by their concern that Presidents would fall prey to the lure
of fame, the Founders thus structured the war power in a way that
conflicts with the original understanding of the War Powers Clause as
articulated by previous scholarship. The Founders intended that the
clause would vest in Congress principal responsibility for initiating
conflict; in this regard, pro-Congress scholars have been right and
pro-Executive scholars wrong. But the Founders denied the President
a veto over congressional decisions to wage war, something that all
34
scholars have missed.
Part I of the Article outlines the background against which this
work is set. It discusses the post-World War II era's history of controversies about presidential authority to initiate conflict, the current debate among academics about the original understanding, and the
ways in which the explanations that have been offered fail. Part II
then begins the analysis of why Congress was given the sole power to
start wars by discussing the Founders' conception of fame and the role
of that conception in the constitutional order. Part III argues that the
Founders' concern that a President's desire for immortal fame would
lead him to start wars that were not in the national interest caused
them to give Congress alone the power to start war. This Part begins
with a close analysis of the way legislators spoke and wrote about war
during the ratification debates. It then turns to the nation's first three
crises involving the war power, focusing in each instance on how the
desire for individual fame and the desire for war were linked in statements from the period. Indeed, in one of the examined documents,
James Madison explicitly states that Congress was given the power to
start war because a President would use that power too aggressively in
33
34

See infra Part III.
See infra text accompanying notes 181-201, 380-81.
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order to achieve fame.3 5 This statement from the most important
Founder dramatically supports the thesis of this Article concerning
the original understanding.
Part IV then explores the contemporary significance of the historical analysis. For originalists, the evidence offered here is important
because it greatly strengthens the case for a pro-Congress reading of
the Clause. It is also important because it suggests that the President
should not be able to veto a declaration of war.
The thesis of this Article is significant for nonoriginalists as well.
Although it does not try to treat the matter conclusively, Part IV
presents evidence that, even though we no longer think of people as
motivated by a thirst for fame in the eighteenth century sense, Presidents have, in fact, been so motivated. A range of historical accounts
indicate that Presidents, in contemplating questions of war, have been
motivated by a desire for fame. That desire may, in part, explain why
throughout our history Presidents have typically been more in favor of
initiating wars than Congress. Recognition of the motivational stakes
in the war powers area indicates that courts' current application of the
political question doctrine to avoid resolution of war powers controversies is misguided. Such a strategy rests on the false premise that
this is an area in which Congress will struggle for control, when in fact
this is an area in which Congress has an incentive to evade responsibility. More broadly, for nonoriginalists, recognition of the fact that the
President has an incentive to favor war does not resolve the question
of who should have the responsibility to decide questions of war.
Rediscovery of the Founders' concern ultimately leads back to the two
fundamental questions with which the Founders struggled and which
have largely been forgotten: When does the desire for a place in history become dangerous? When does it, instead, inspire greatness?
I
THE DEBATE ABOUT THE WAR POWERS CLAUSE

The meaning of the War Powers Clause has long been the subject
of bitter dispute, both in the realm of politics and in the realm of
academia. This Part begins by presenting in summary fashion recent
presidential military actions and congressional responses. Strikingly,
35 SeeJames Madison, "Helvidius"Number 4, in 15 THE PAPERS OFJAMES MADISON 106,
108 (Robert Rutland et al. eds., Virginia University Press 1985) [hereinafter MADISON PAPERS]. Madison wrote:
It is in war, finally, that laurels are to be gathered, and it is the executive

brow they are to encircle. The strongest passions, and most dangerous
weaknesses of the human breast;.., the honorable or venial love of fame,
are all in conspiracy against the desire and duty of peace.
Id. See also infra text accompanying notes 309-18.
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the Executive has grown more, not less, aggressive in recent years.3 6
The Part then discusses the two principal schools of academic thought
concerning the meaning of the War Powers Clause. It focuses on the
ways in which they treat the original understanding and its significance, and concludes by discussing why neither school of thought has
convincingly made its case.
A.

The Executive Branch and the War Power Since the Korean
War

Throughout most of this nation's history, Presidents did not
claim that they could commit the nation to war without congressional
authorization.3 7 In 1950, for the first time, the Executive explicitly
took the position that it did not need congressional authorization to
send troops abroad to fight.3 8 In justifying his decision to send
United States troops into Korea, President Truman relied on a Security Council resolution.3 9 Subsequently, after consulting with Secretary
of State Dean Acheson, he decided not to seek congressional authorization, but to rely on his powers as President and Commander in
Chief.40 The Department of State issued a supporting memorandum
of law.

41

President Johnson's actions in Vietnam were, in contrast, almost
modest. As in Korea, the Department of State formally took the position that the President needed no congressional support to send
troops into combat.42 Nonetheless, PresidentJohnson could plausibly
claim that he had secured congressional approval for every stage of
36
For example, PresidentJohnson had a legitimate claim to congressional authorization for the Viemam War, while Presidents Reagan, Bush, and Clinton, in contrast, have
repeatedly either sent troops into combat without congressional authorization or been prepared to do so. See infra text accompanying notes 42-68.
37 For relevant presidential statements, see REvELEY, supranote 14, at 277-85; THOMAS
& THOMAS, supra note 23, at 31-35; Francis D. Wormuth, The Vietnam War: The President
versus the Constitution. in 2 THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAw 711 (Richard A. Falk
ed., 1969); Lawyer's Memorandum, Indochina: The ConstitutionalCrisis, 116 CONG. REc.
15,410-16 (1970).
38 See ELY, supra note 8, at 10.
39 See President Truman, U.S. Air and Sea Forces Ordered into Supporting Action
(June 27, 1950), in DEP'T ST. BULL, July 3, 1950, at 5.
40
See SCHLESINGER, supra note 13, at 131-33.
41 Department of State Memorandum Authority of President to Repel the Attack in
Korea (July 3, 1950), in DEP'T ST. BULL, July 31, 1950, at 173, 173 ("The President, as
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, has full control over the
use thereof. . . .[The President's power to send the Armed Forces outside the country is
not dependent on Congressional authority .... ").
42 See Office of the Legal Adviser, supra note 23, at 1101 ("The Constitution leaves to
the President the judgment to determine whether the circumstances of a particular armed
attack are so urgent and the potential consequences so threatening to the security of the
United States that he should act without formally consulting the Congress.").
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the Vietnam War through the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution; 43 Congress's
1967 declaration of "its firm intentions to provide all necessary support for members of the Armed Forces of the United States fighting in
Vietnam"; 44 and congressional appropriation statutes.45 Significantly,
Dean Ely and Professor Henkin, despite their general criticism of executive branch overreaching in warmaking, have found this claim of
46
congressional approval convincing.
Recent history is very different. When President Reagan directed
the invasion of Grenada in 1983, he simply acted "with respect to the
conduct of foreign relations and as Commander-in-Chief of the
United States Armed Forces" 47 without subsequently seeking congressional ratification of his actions. 48 Similarly, in 1986, he unilaterally
ordered the bombing of a number of targets in Libya pursuant to his
power as Commander in Chief.49
President Bush continued this trend. Without seeking congressional approval, he sent 24,000 troops into Panama to oust the government of General Manuel Noriega. 50 Later, as the Bush administration
prepared for the Gulf War, it initially took the position that it would
not secure congressional approval. 51 Although it ultimately reversed
its course and obtained authorization for the commencement of hostilities,52 President Bush repeatedly proclaimed that he did not need
that congressional sanction to send troops into combat. At one point
he declared, "I didn't have to get permission from some old goat in
'55
the United States Congress to kick Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait.
H.R.J. Res. 1145, Pub. L. No. 88-408, 78 Stat. 384 (1964).
Act of Mar. 16, 1967 Pub. L. No. 90-5, § 401, 81 Stat. 5, 6.
See, e.g., Defense Appropriation Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-171, § 638, 83 Stat. 486
(1969); H.R.J. Res. 447, Pub. L. No. 89-18, 79 Stat. 109 (1965).
46 See ELY, supra note 8, at 12-46; Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONsTrrUTION 101-02 (1972).
47 Ronald Reagan, Letter to the Speaker of the House and the President Pro
Tempore of the Senate on the Deployment of United States Forces in Grenada (Oct. 25,
1983), 1983 PUB. PAPERS: RONALD REAGAN 1512, 1513.
48
See FISHER, supra note 9, at 141-42.
49 See Ronald Reagan, Letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the
President Pro Tempore of the Senate on the United States Air Strike Against Libya (Apr.
16, 1986), 1986 PuB. PAPERS: RONALD REAGAN 478, 478.
50
See Louis Henkin, The Invasion of Panamaunder InternationalLaw: A Gross Violation,
29 COLUM.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 293, 293-94, 298 (1991).
51 See Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, Testimony at Hearing of the Senate Armed
Services Committee, Federal News Service, Dec. 3, 1990, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Script File.
52 See Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution, Pub. L. No.
102-1, 105 Stat. 3, 3-4 (1991).
53
Remarks of President George Bush Before the Texas State Republican Convention,
Federal News Service, June 20, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Script File. For
further statements that congressional support was not necessary to launch a military attack
against Iraq, see George Bush, Remarks at Dedication Ceremony of the Social Sciences
Complex at Princeton University in Princeton, New Jersey, 27 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
43

44
45
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The election of a Democratic President in 1992 did not cause the
trend to abate. At the end of his administration, President Bush sent
United States troops to Somalia as part of a United Nations relief effort. In June 1993, when twenty-three Pakistani soldiers were killed in
Somalia, President Clinton, without seeking congressional authorization, altered the nature of the relief effort by ordering United States
military action against Mohamed Farah Aideed, the Somali political
leader whom the United Nations believed was responsible for the killing. 54 The President simply announced that, in response to the killing of the Pakistani soldiers, the United States mission in Somalia had
55
become a military one.

The following year, President Clinton prepared to send troops
into Haiti to oust that country's military junta without receiving congressional sanction. 56 He stated, "Like my predecessors of both parties, I have not agreed that I was constitutionally mandated" to secure
congressional approval before military intervention. 5 7 United States
troops were on the verge of invasion when former President Jimmy
Carter negotiated an agreement under which Haitian leaders resigned. 58 In some regards, however, Bosnia represents an even more
dramatic assertion of executive authority over the military. Troops
were deployed into a war zone pursuant to the President's Commander-in-Chief power,5 9 not only without congressional approval,
589, 590 (May 10, 1991); George Bush, Statement on Signing the Resolution Authorizing
the Use of Military Force Against Iraq, 27 WEEKI.y COMP. PRES. Doc. 48 (Jan. 14, 1991).
54 See FISHER, supra note 9, at 153-54.
55 See id. at 153. Under pressure from Congress, President Clinton agreed to withdraw all troops from Somalia by March 31, 1994, and he carried out that agreement. See id.
at 154.
56 For discussion of the preparation of an invasion of Haiti and subsequent events, see
id.at 154-57.
57 PresidentialNews Conference: Health Care, Haiti and Crime Transcript of President Clinton's News Conference at the White House, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1994, at A16. Assistant Attorney
General Walter Dellinger justified the sending of troops to Haiti in a more limited way,
arguing, among other things, that the deployment of troops would not be "war" in the
constitutional sense because "a 'war' does not exist where United States troops are
deployed at the invitation of a fully legitimate government in circumstances in which the
nature, scope, and duration of the deployment are such that the use of force involved does
not rise to the level of 'war.'" Walter Dellinger, After the Cold War: PresidentialPower and the
Use of MilitaryForce, 50 U. MIAMI L. Ray. 107, 115 (1995). See also Word for Word: A President's Ability to Declare War, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1994, atA29 (Office of Legal Counsel letter
offering legal basis for troop deployment in Haiti). Neither house explicitly opposed the
invasion. After the Security Council passed a resolution on July 31, 1994 urging the removal of the Haitian government, however, the United States Senate unanimously voted
that that resolution "does not constitute authorization for the deployment of United States
Armed Forces in Haiti under the Constitution of the United States or pursuant to the War
Powers Resolution." 140 CONG. REc. S10,415, 10,433, 10,510 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1994).
58 Elaine Sciolino, On the Brink of War, a Tense Battle of Wills, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1994,
at Al.
59 See Donald L. Robinson, Who Has the Power to Put US. Troops in Harm's Way ?,CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 19, 1995 (discussing President Clinton's "insisttence] that he did

1997]

THE POWER TO DECLARE WAR

705

but over the clearly and repeatedly expressed objections of the House
60
of Representatives.
Congress's principal check on the military power of the Executive
has been the War Powers Resolution, 61 which was passed in 1973 over
President Nixon's veto. 62 The resolution provides that the President

must notify Congress within forty-eight hours of the start of combat
involving American troops and that, unless Congress authorizes hostilities, he or she must withdraw those troops within sixty days (a time
period that can be extended to ninety days upon appropriate presidential certification).63 The measure explicitly presents itself as reflecting the constitutional dictates according to the original

understanding, not as altering either the constitutional powers of
Congress or of the President. It states that "[i] t is the purpose of this
chapter to fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the
64
United States."
Presidents have seen the matter differently. In his veto message,
President Nixon denounced the resolution as an unconstitutional infringement on his powers as Commander in Chief and as violative of
not need congressional approval to enforce the Dayton Agreement"); CongressionalApprovalNot Needed forBosnia Force, White House Says, CHi. TRIB., Oct. 9, 1995, § 1 at 3 (quoting
White House Chief of Staff Leon Panetta as stating that "[President Clinton] believes that,
like all other presidents, he is not about to give up on his prerogatives as commander in
chief.").
60
On October 30, 1995, the House passed a sense of the House resolution stating
that "no United States Armed [F]orces should be deployed ... until the Congress has
approved such a deployment." H.R. Res. 247(2), 104th Cong., 1st Sess., 141 CONe,. RIEC.
H11398 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1995). On November 17, the House passed a bill providing
that, in the absence of future specific appropriations, the United States was not to use
government funds to support United States troops in Bosnia. See H.R. Res. 2606, 104th
Cong., 1st Sess., 141 CONG. REc. H13,233 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1995) (enacted). After troops
were deployed, the Senate passed a resolution that expressed "reservations... about President Clinton's decision to deploy United States Armed Forces," but, since the mission had
begun, sanctioned it provided that the United States would lead an effort to arm Bosnian
Muslims and that United States troops would leave Bosnia within "approximately one
year." S.J. Res. 44, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., 141 CONG. REc. S18552 (daily ed. Dec. 13, 1995).
The resolution was not intended as support for the underlying policy; Senator Bob Dole,
its co-sponsor, declared, "[W]e oppose the decision to deploy troops." Id. at S18550. The
House was even more critical of the President's actions. It passed a resolution deploring
the fact that "[d]espite the expressed will of the House of Representatives. .. , the President has chosen to proceed with the deployment of approximately 20,000 members of the
United States Armed Forces" and formally declared "opposition to the President's policy."
H.R. Res. 302, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., 141 CONG. REc. H14849 (daily ed. Dec. 13, 1995).
For an excellent and detailed account of presidential activity in the years since the
Second World War, see FISHER, supra note 9, at 70-161.
61 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-48 (1994).
62 See Text of President Nixon's Message Vetoing the War Powers Resolution [hereinafter Nixon Veto], reprinted in REVELEY, supra note 14, at 293-97.
63 See 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b) (1994).
64 Id. § 1541(a). The statute asserts that the Constitution permits the President to
commit troops to combat on his own authority only where an attack upon American territory or against American troops creates "a national emergency." Id. § 1541(c).
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the original understanding. 65 Nixon's response has served as the
model for subsequent presidential action. As Professor Michael Paulsen has written, "No President has accepted the 1973 War Powers Resolution as binding, on the ground that it unconstitutionally interferes
with the President's powers as Commander-in-Chief." 66 Since 1973,
Presidents committing United States troops to combat have repeatedly failed to notify Congress or have filed a report which was intentionally not identified as a hostilities report (and which therefore,
according to executive branch officials, did not start the War Powers
Resolution's sixty day clock). 67 In the face of Executive actions reflecting the view that the Resolution is unconstitutional, Congress has
failed to muster anything remotely resembling an effective response.
It has neither denied funding to any of these military efforts nor legislatively proclaimed that, despite the fact that the President has not
filed a required hostilities report, the sixty day clock was triggered. 68
B.

Competing Interpretations of the War Powers Clause

Given the ongoing real-world controversy about the meaning of
the War Powers Clause and the enormous stakes involved in such controversy, it is hardly surprising that, since the start of the Vietnam War,
the academic debate about the meaning of the War Powers Clause has
been one of the most prominent in constitutional law. Two sharply
divergent readings of the Clause have emerged, and scholars have justified each reading as consistent with the original understanding.
Defenders of a broad Executive power to initiate combat have
claimed that the Framers intended that the War Powers Clause be
65 See Nixon Veto, supra note 62, at 293, 295.
66 Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most DangerousBranch: Executive Power to Say What the
Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 267 (1994).
67 SeeJohn 0. McGinnis, ConstitutionalReview by the Executive in ForeignAffairs and War
Powers: A Consequence of Rational Choice in the SeparationofPowers, 56 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROS.
293, 315-22 (1993) (discussing executive branch nullification of resolution). See also ELY,
supra note 8, at 49 (listing the war in Indochina, the Iranian rescue effort of 1980, the
sending of troops to Lebanon in 1982-1983, the invasion of Grenada in 1983, the Gulf of
Sidra incident and Tripoli bombing of 1986, the 1987-1988 Persian Gulf War against Iran,
and the invasion of Panama in 1989 as instances in which Presidents should have, but did

not, file hostilities reports). For examples of presidential reports, see Text of President
Ford's Mayaguez Report of May 15, 1975, reprinted in REvELEY, supra note 14, at 301-03;
Text of President Carter's Iran Report of April 26, 1980, reprinted in REVELEY supranote 14,
at 303-06; Report of President George Bush (Dec. 21, 1989), in THOMAS M. FRANCK &
MICHAEL J. GLENNON, FOREIGN RELATIONS AND NATIONAL SECURry LAw 596-97 (2d ed.
1993).
68 See Yoo, supra note 22, at 182. Whether the War Powers Resolution could be re-

vised in such a way as to be made effective is a matter for debate. CompareELY, supra note 8,
at 6--66 (suggesting how the Resolution could be amended to make it effective) with Bob-

bitt, supranote 15, at 1371, 1397-1400 (rejecting the War Powers Resolution as an "absurd
failure").
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read narrowly.6 9 Under this view, when the Framers gave Congress
the power to "declare war," they intentionally used a term with a precise meaning in international law, a meaning familiar to them from
71
70
their reading of Blackstone and such civil law scholars as Grotius

and Vattel. 72 Dean Rostow, a leading proponent of this view, has
written:
Under international law, force may be used between states both in
time of war and in time of peace.... A "declaration of war" transforms the relationship between the belligerents into a state of
war.... The state of war contemplates unlimited hostilities between
69 See, e.g., Bobbitt, supra note 15, at 1375-76; Emerson, War Powers Resolution, supra
note 23, at 211-13; Rostow, Once More, supra note 19, at 5-7; Yoo, supra note 22, at 193-94.
70 For Blackstone, conflict could begin without a declaration of war. In particular,
issuance of letters of marque and reprisal created an "incomplete state of hostilities." 1
WILLIAM BLACSrONE, COMMENTARIES *250. The declaration of war served a limited,
although important, role: "[I]n order to make a war completely effectual, it is necessary
with us in England that it be publicly declared and duly proclaimed by the king's authority;,
and, then, all parts of both the contending nations, from the highest to the lowest, are
bound by it." Id. Blackstone thus treated the declaration of war as the culminating step
with respect to conflict between nations.
71 Grotius observed that "most wars are begun without declaration of war." Huco GRoTIUs, ON THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 318 (William Whewell trans., abr. ed. 1853) (citing
Dio Chrysostom). The declaration was necessary for certain "peculiar effects," id. at 319,
such as to authorize seizure of the property of foreign nationals. See id. at 318.
72 Like Grotius, Vattel concluded that not all wars had to be declared, though his
treatment differed from Grotius's, see supranote 71, since Vattel took the position that in
some situations declarations of war were necessary to begin hostilities legitimately. Vattel
wrote, "He who is attacked and only wages defensive war, needs not to make any hostile
declaration . . . ." EMMERICH DE VATrEL, THE LAw OF NATIONS 316 (Joseph Chitty ed.,
1861). Thus, a declaration of war was not necessary to respond to attack. Pro-Executive
scholarJ. Terry Emerson has suggested thAt Vattel distinguished between "wars of aggression and conquest," which required declarations of war, and defensive wars, which did not
require such declarations. See Emerson, War Powers Resolution, supra note 23, at 212. This,
however, was not the distinction that Vattel himself drew. For Vattel, nondefensive warsthe wars which required a declaration of war-were those in which the nation had not
been attacked, but in which justice nonetheless dictated going to war. "The right of making war," Vattel began his chapter on declarations of war,
belongs to nations only as a remedy against injustice: it is the offspring of
unhappy necessity. This remedy is so dreadful in its effects, so destructive
to mankind, so grievous even to the party who -has recourse to it, that unquestionably the law of nature allows of it only in the last extremity,-that is
to say, when every other expedient proves ineffectual for the maintenance
ofjustice.
VATTEI, supra, at 314. Although Emerson suggests that Vattel thought that declarations of
war were the means by which wars of "aggression and conquest" were sanctioned, see Emerson, War Powers Resolution, supra note 23, at 212 & n.131, Vattel believed that unjust wars
violated natural law, writing that "in order to be justifiable in taking up arms, it is necessary
...[t]hat we have ajust cause of complaint." Id.
Vattel agreed with Grotius that declarations of war had important juridical consequences: "Without such a public declaration of war, it would, in a treaty of peace, be too
difficult to determine those acts which are to be considered as the effects of war, and those
that each nation may set down as injuries of which she means to demand reparation." Id.
at 316.

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:695

the belligerents, the internment or expulsion of enemy aliens, the
termination of diplomatic relations, the sequestration or even confiscation of enemy property, and the imposition of regulationscensorship, for example-which would be unthinkable in liberal73
minded states during peacetime.
In other words, the power to declare war is a quasi-judicial power:
Congress determines whether to make a legal declaration that a state
of war exists. Such a determination is significant, since a declaration
has important consequences for the rights of both citizens and aliens.
But the declaration typically follows the onset of hostilities, rather
than preceding them, and the declaration is not necessary to legalize
the hostilities themselves.7 4
Similarly, when the Founders gave Congress the power to "grant
Letters of Marque and Reprisal," 75 they were also using "language...
peculiar to international law," 76 and, again, that language had a precise, and limited, meaning. Sovereigns granted letters of marque and
reprisal to individuals allowing them to pursue specific claims against
citizens of other countries. 77 These people were thereby authorized
to take the property-and sometimes, even seize the persons-of
their debtors and those who had wronged them. In wartime, the letters empowered civilians to capture the property of the enemy and
her citizens.7 8 But the power to grant letters of marque and reprisal
was not the power to start war. 79 For proponents of this view, then,
the power to initiate conflict is not to be found solely-or even primarily-in the War Powers Clause. Rather, it is to be found in the
Constitution's designation of the President as Commander in Chief3 0
and, in addition, in its grant to him or her of all executive power.8 1
Proponents of the pro-Congress reading of the War Powers
Clause offer a diametrically opposed reading of the original understanding. They reject the idea that the phrases in the Clause were
intended to be read in the established, technical sense. According to
Rostow, Once More, supranote 19, at 6.
74 For more extensive development of this argument, see Bobbitt, supra note 15, at
1396-1400; Emerson, War Powers Resolution, supra note 23, at 211-12; Rostow, Once More,
supra note 19, at 3-18; Yoo, supra note 22, at 204-08.
73

75
76

U.S. CONST.art I, § 8, cl. 11.
Rostow, Once More, supra note 19, at 6.
77
See Yoo, supra note 22, at 250-51.
78 See id.
79 See id.at 206.
80
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.1.
81
See id. art. 2, § 1, cl.1. Pro-Executive scholars do maintain, however, that the Framers did not intend for Congress to be powerless to check the President, since they gave it
the power "to raise and support armies," id.art. I, § 8, cl.12, and the power of the purse,
id.art. I, § 8, cl.1-2, 5. See Bobbitt, supra note 15, at 1388-1400; Emerson, War Powers
Resolution, supra note 23, at 201-03; Rostow, Once More, supra note 19, at 14-15; Yoo, supra
note 22, at 209-10.
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Professor Charles Lofgren, for example, the word "declare" as used in
the Constitution "had a broader meaning than it did in the treatises
and international practice. It meant 'commence.' "82 Similarly, the
phrase "Letters of Marque and Reprisal" "conferred on Congress
power over general reprisals outside the context of declared war." 83
84
Most important, the two phrases were meant to be read together.
They are the only two specific grants of war-initiating power in the
Constitution. 85 Thus, regardless of how they are parsed individually,
together they mean that the Founders intended Congress to have the
power to initiate all conflict-except when necessary to repel sudden
attacks. In this regard, it should be stressed that pro-Congress originalists do not maintain that all wars had to be formally declared, merely
that they be approved in advance in some fashion. As Dean Ely writes,
"[A]ll wars, big or small, 'declared' in so many words or not ... had to
86
be legislatively authorized."
Under this view, the Founders were not ignorant of the fact that
the phrases they used had specific meanings at international law.
They knew, moreover, that by the eighteenth century most wars were
not declared-as Hamilton wrote in Federalist No. 25, "[T]he ceremony of a formal denunciation of war has of late fallen into disuse
...
."8 7-and letters of marque and reprisal were rarely issued. 88 But,
as Professor Lofgren observed, "[D]eviation from international usage
[with respect to these terms] would have seemed proper... since the
Constitution involved domestic arrangements." 89 According to Professor Bestor, "[T]he phrase 'declare war' [in the Constitution] was
universally understood as synonymous with what the Articles of Confederation had described as [Congress's] 'sole and exclusive right and
power of determining on ... war.' "90
Pro-Executive scholars have a counter to such claims (apart from
offering their competing vision of the original understanding). These
writers contend that, even if the pro-Congress camp is correct about
the original understanding of the War Powers Clause, that understanding should not bar Presidents from initiating conflict. The argu82

Lofgren, Understanding,supra note 12, at 695.

83

Id. at 696.

See, e.g., FISHER, supra note 9, at 2-3.
85 Proponents of the pro-Congress reading argue that the Commander-in-Chief
Clause was intended to give the President control over the military only after war has commenced. See Fisher, supra note 9, at 9-12.
86 ELY, supra note 8, at 3 (footnote omitted).
87 THE FEDERALIST No. 25, at 161 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
88 See, e.g., ELY, supranote 8, at 3, 140 n.5; Bestor, supranote 14, at 608-09; Lofgren,
Understanding,supra note 12, at 694-97.
89 Lofgren, Understanding,supra note 12, at 695.
90 Bestor, supra note 14, at 608 (alteration in original) (quoting ARTS. OF CONFED. art.
IX).
84
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ment is not that original intent is never relevant, but that it is
irrelevant here for reasons unique to the War Powers Clause.
The first "unique" reason advanced is that, regardless of the original understanding, the President's ability to initiate and conduct war
without explicit congressional approval is constitutional because of
long-standing practice. For example, J. Terry Emerson, after stating
that there are over two hundred incidents in which Presidents have
initiated the use of military force abroad, concludes that" 'history has
legitimated the practice of presidential war-making.'-91 Emerson follows Henry Monaghan, who notes "the long and ever-accumulating
practice of presidential 'war-making"' and observes that "[a] practice
so deeply embedded in our governmental structure should be treated
92
as decisive of the constitutional issue."
A closely-related second reason is that this practice reflects
broader constitutional concerns that have become more pressing with
the passage of time. Thus, Judge Bork argues that the President has
"primacy in foreign affairs," and that primacy is the joint product of
constitutional structure and historical evolution: "The respective roles
of Congress and the president developed according to their structural
capacities and limitations. Congress, consisting of 535 members assisted by huge staffs, is obviously incapable of swift, decisive, and flexible action in the employment of armed force . . . ."9 Because
91

Emerson, War Powers Legislation, supra note 23, at 72 (quoting with approval

Monaghan, supranote 18, at 29). Proponents of this view disagree on the precise number
of such incidents. Writing a few years before Emerson, the Office of the Legal Adviser for
the Department of State justified President Johnson's activities in Viemam by asserting
more modestly that there were 125 instances of presidential warmaking. See Office of the
Legal Adviser, supranote 23, at 1101. Critics of this view both contest its history and the
underlying theory. Dean Ely thus argues that "post-ratification practice in violation of the
Constitution [cannot] change it," and that "the original constitutional understanding was
quite consistently honored from the framing until 1950." ELY, supra note 8, at 10. For
other criticisms of the view that there was a pattern of executive-initiated conflict prior to
the Korean War, see SCHLESINGER, supranote 13, at 133; WoRMuTH ET A.., supra note 14, at
140-49; W. Taylor Reveley III, Presidential War-Making: ConstitutionalPrerogativeor Usurpation, 55 VA. L. REv. 1243, 1258 (1969).
92 Monaghan, supra note 18, at 31.
93 Bork, Foreword,supranote 16, at x. Explicitly embracingJudge Bork's position, Professor W. Michael Reisman has similarly declared that original intent should not control
the meaning of the War Powers Clause: "The Constitution is part of our constitutive process in which we determine how to establish and maintain our fundamental decision-making institutions so that they can provide liberty, security, and the fulfillment of other
constitutional goals in ways optimally consistent with historic values but responsive to contemporary exigencies." Reisman, supranote 21, at 212. See also ELY, supra note 8, at 143
n.24 (stating thatJudge Bork's view of War Powers Clause "seems out of accord with [his]
usual strongly argued 'original intent' approach to constitutional interpretation"). Dean
Rostow has advanced an argument similar to Judge Bork's. See Rostow, Once More, supra
note 19, at 48 ("The problem facing the nation is to fashion and refashion the Presidency
and Congress as responsible and cooperative institutions capable of carrying out a foreign
policy adequate to the security needs of our times and of the forseeable future.").
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situations change so rapidly and dangers to the national well-being
arise almost instantaneously, necessity dictates that the Executive have
the power to use force abroad without congressional approval. As
Judge Bork has argued, "The need for Presidents to have that power,
particularly in the modem age, should be obvious to almost
anyone."94
In contrast, pro-Congress scholars have not been as quick to argue that their reading of the War Powers Clause is superior, even if
not supported by the original understanding. Ely's treatment here is
illustrative. The saliency he accords to the original understanding in
framing his proposal for contemporary jurisprudence is similar to that
accorded the original understanding by, for example, Professors Glennon,95 Koh, 9 6 and Henkin. 97 Ely offers three closely-related reasons
which he suggests animated the Founders and support giving Congress the power to initiate war. First, and most important, the requirement of congressional consent ensures that "the concurrence of a
number of people of various points of view" has been obtained before
the nation goes to war.9 8 (Ely explicitly assumes here that the War
Powers Clause also requires that the President consent before the nation go to war).99 Second, large bodies move more slowly, ensuring
careful consideration before war begins. 10 0 Third, "[t]he requirement of authorization by both houses of Congress was.., calculated
to increase the probability that the American people would support
any war we entered into."' 01 But the focus of his argument is not that
these rationales are independently correct. Rather, it is that, because
the original understanding is clear, it must be followed. He writes:
One of the recurrent discoveries of academic writing about constitutional law-an all but certain ticket to tenure-is that from the
standpoint of twentieth-century observers, the "original understanding" of the document's framers and ratifiers can be obscure to the
point of inscrutability. Often this is true. In this case, however, it
02
isn't.1
Because of its clarity, the original intent is dispositive: "In language
and recorded purpose the War Clause made an unmistakable point

94

Bork, Erosion, supra note 16, at 698.

95

See MICHAELJ. GLENNON, CONSrITUTIoNAL DIPLOMACY 80-84 (1990).

96
97

See KOH, supra note 10, at 69-79.
See HENKIN, supranote 46, at 32-35.

98

ELY, supra note 8, at 4.

99
100
101
102

See id.
See id.

Id.
Id. at 3.
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that needed no further gloss: Acts of war must be authorized by
103
Congress."
Thus, the question is squarely presented: Who is right about the
original understanding? And is the underlying rationale that informed the Founders' decisionmaking one that merits serious independent regard, or is it merely one that merits respect to the extent
that the original understanding merits respect?
The next section examines the evidence to which scholars typically attach the greatest significance-the debates at the Philadelphia
constitutional convention and the state ratifying conventions. The
section focuses on what the words "To declare War" meant. There was
almost no debate in Philadelphia on the Commander-in-Chief Clause
or the phrase "letters of marque and reprisal." 10 4 Neither generated
much concern. To the extent that there was discussion, the Commander-in-Chief Clause received more. 05 According to both pro-Executive and pro-Congress writers, 0 6 the most influential comments
about the Commander-in-Chief Clause were made by Alexander Hamilton and James Iredell, both of whose statements reflect a view of the
Commander-in-Chief power as limited to commanding troops once
war is in progress. 10 7 At the same time, these comments do not repreId. at 10.
The principal discussion of the Commander-in-Chief Clause at the Philadelphia
convention occurred when the convention considered the Committee on Detail's proposal, under which the President had equal command over the Army and Navy of the United
States, and of the Militia of the Several States. See 2 Farrand, supra note 27, at 426. Roger
Sherman moved that the Commander-in-Chief Clause be amended to provide that the
President would only have control of the state militia "when called into the actual service of
the [United States]" and his proposal was adopted. Id. (emphasis omitted). This comment about control of state militia is of little relevance to contemporary debates. As for
the letters of marque and reprisal, the record is even slighter, the only significant comment
being Elbridge Gerry's assertion, with reference to a list of legislative powers that "something [ought to be] inserted concerning letters of marque, which he thought not included
in the power of war." Id. at 326.
105 See supranote 104 (summarizing relevant discussion on both topics).
106 Compare Lofgren, Understanding,supra note 12, at 685-86 (focusing on Iredell and
Hamilton), with Yoo, supra note 22, at 277-78 (same).
107 Hamilton contrasted the King's powers as Commander in Chief with those of the
President, which he described as "much inferior" to the King's:
[The President's power as Commander in Chief] would amount to nothing
more than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval
forces, as first General and Admiral of the confederacy[;] while that of the
British King extends to the declaringof war and to the raisingand regulating
of fleets and armies; all which by the Constitution under consideration
would appertain to the Legislature.
THE FEDERALIST No. 69, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). Similarly, in discussing the President's Commander-in-Chief powers, Iredell stated:
A very material difference may be observed between this power, and the
authority of the king of Great Britain under similar circumstances. The
king of Great Britain is not only the commander-in-chief of the land and
naval forces, but has power, in time of war, to raise fleets and armies. He
has also authority to declare war. The President has not the power of de103

104
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sent a sufficient quantity of evidence to reveal clearly the meaning of
the Commander-in-Chief Clause or, by inference, the meaning of the
War Powers Clause.
C.

The Framing of the War Powers Clause

Although the War Powers Clause has become the source of extensive controversy, it received very limited discussion at the time of
the founding. Moreover, as discussed below, the critical passage in
the debates at the Constitutional Convention is obscure and confusing. Thus, the documents on which scholars traditionally focus in
their quest to determine the original understanding of constitutional
text provide only limited insight.
The initial discussion at the Constitutional Convention concerning the war power occurred in response to the plan of government
submitted by Edmund Randolph of Virginia. The Virginia plan did
not address the question of who should be able to commit the nation
to war; it merely allocated to the "National Legislature ... the Legislative Rights vested in Congress by the Confederation" and assigned to
the "National Executive... the Executive rights vested in Congress by
the Confederation."1 0 The question of which powers were executive
and which were legislative was left open. A number of speakers urged
that the war power be given to Congress. While South Carolina's
Charles Pinckney proclaimed himself an advocate of a "vigorous Executive," he declared that he "was afraid the Executive powers of [the
existing] Congress might extend to peace & war."10 9 James Wilson
argued that the "Prerogatives of the British Monarch [were not] a
proper guide in defining the Executive powers."11 0 "Some of these
prerogatives," he stated, "were of a Legislative nature. Among others
that of war & peace &c.""1 James Madison "agree[d with] Wilson in
his difinition [sic] of executive powers-executive powers ex vi termini, do not include the Rights of war & peace &c. but the powers
[should] be confined and defined-if large we shall have the Evils of
elective Monarchies."" 2 Finally, John Rutledge of South Carolina announced that "he was not for giving [the Executive] the power of war
claring war by his own authority, nor that of raising fleets and armies.
These powers are vested in other hands. The power of declaring war is
expressly given to Congress ....
4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVN'TONS 107-08 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1907)

[hereinafter Elliot].
108 1 Farrand, supra note 27, at 21.
109
Id. at 64-65 (alteration in original).
110 Id.at 65.
111 Id. at 65-66. See also id. at 7_-74 ("Mr. Wilson said the great qualities in the several
parts of the Executive are vigor and dispatch. Making peace and war are generally determined by Writers on the Laws of Nations to be legislative powers.").
112 Id. at 70.
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and peace." 113 No one argued that the Executive should have the
11 4
power to initiate war.
The Convention subsequently created the Committee on Detail
and assigned to it the task of preparing a constitution that reflected
the decisions previously made. 15 None of the resolutions forwarded
to the Committee, however, provided guidance in allocation of the
war-initiating function. 116 At the same time, as indicated above, to
the extent the matter had been debated, the consensus had been that
the power to initiate war should be a legislative function. Moreover,
Wilson and Randolph submitted draft constitutions that gave the legislature the power "to make war."117 Reflecting these points of view, the
Committee's final report assigned Congress the sole power "To make
war; To raise armies; To build and equip fleets;" as well as "To call
forth the aid of the militia, in order to execute the laws of the Union,
enforce treaties, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions.""18 The
Convention debated the proposed War Powers Clause on August 17,
1787. Although the account of what was said-the account recorded
in Madison's notes-is brief, the debate was apparently the most sustained discussion of the proper allocation of the power to declare war.
Therefore, this short and cryptic interchange tends to be the focus of
modem academic discussion about the original understanding." 9
Although it is clear that one participant in that debate, South Carolina's Pierce Butler, 120 thought that the President should have the
Id. at 65.
The only other participant in the Convention to make relevant statements at this
point in the debates concerning the scope of the executive power was Roger Sherman.
Apparently concurring in the prevailing sentiment that the Executive should not have
power over war and peace, Sherman responded to Pinckney's expressions of concern by
stating that he saw the Executive "as nothing more than an institution for carrying the will
of the Legislature into effect." Id.
115 See 2 Farrand, supra note 27, at 85.
116 William Paterson also formally submitted a plan to the Committee but, similar to
Randolph's plan, it did not allocate the power to initiate war. See 1 Farrand, supra note 27,
at 242-45 (Paterson's plan). Alexander Hamilton offered a third plan of governance,
although, unlike Randolph and Paterson, he did not make a formal proposal. In general,
Hamilton envisioned an extremely powerful Executive. Indeed, a few years later, as the
author of the Pacificus letters, Hamilton was to take an expansive view of the Executive's
war powers. See infra Part III.B. But in his speech he did not argue that the Executive
should have the power to start wars. Rather, while the Executive was "to have the direction
of war when authorized or begun," Hamilton urged, without offering an explanatory justification, that the Senate "have the sole power of declaring war." 1 Farrand, supranote 27,
at 292.
117
See 2 Farrand, supra note 27, at 143 (Randolph's draft plan); id. at 168 (Wilson's
draft plan).
113

114

118
119

Id. at 182.
See id. at 314-19.

120
Butler argued that the power "to make war" should be given to the President "who
will have all the requisite qualities, and will not make war but when the Nation will support
it." Id. at 318.
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power to make war, the intent of virtually every other participant is
subject to dispute.
According to Madison's notes, following Butler's comment, he
and Elbridge Gerry "moved to insert 'declare,' striking out 'make' war;
leaving to the Executive the power to repel sudden attacks."' 2 ' This
motion is the critical moment in the debates and has inspired dramatically different readings. Ely, for example, contends that it makes
clear that the President has the power under the Commander-in-Chief
Clause to assume "tactical control" of military operation that had already received congressional authorization, and that it "reserved to
the president the power, without advance congressional authorization, to 'repel sudden attacks."'" 22 Thus, the change did not take
from Congress the sole power to start wars, except in case of emergency created by "sudden attacks." In contrast, pro-Executive scholars
see this amendment as departing from the original proposal and
granting the President the power to start wars; they minimize the significance of the phrase "leaving to the Executive the power to repel
sudden attacks." Thus, Professor Yoo contends that "to repel sudden
attacks" was seen as establishing the floor of executive power under
the amended clause, not its ceiling: "Adopting the amendment made
clear that the President could not unilaterally take the nation into a
total war, but that he might be able to engage the nation in hostilities
23
short of that."'
Following the motion of Gerry and Madison, Connecticut's Roger
Sherman stated that the original language "stood very well. The executive [should] be able to repel and not to commence war. 'Make'
24
better than 'declare' the latter narrowing the power too much."'
Thereby, on a pro-Executive reading, Sherman asserted his view "that
the President already had the power to respond to attacks, and that
reducing Congress' power to that of declaring war would permit the
Executive to commence wars unilaterally."'1 25 A pro-Congress reading
is simply that Sherman feared that the new language would, by narrowing Congress's power, in some unspecified way, increase the power
126
of the Executive.
Gerry then said that he "never expected to hear in a republic a
motion to empower the Executive alone to declare war.' 2 7 The standard pro-Congress reading is that he is responding to Butler's com121

Id.

122

ELY, supra note 8, at 5.

123

Yoo, supra note 22, at 264.
2 Farrand, supra note 27, at 318.
Yoo, supranote 22, at 262.
See Lofgren, Understanding,supra note 12, at 676.
2 Farrand, supranote 27, at 318.

124
125
126
127
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ment that the President should be able to make war. 128 Thus, Gerry is
using "declare" as synonymous with "make."' 29 The problem with this
view is that it breaks the sequence-Sherman, not Butler, was the
speaker before Gerry-and Butler was not addressing the motion that
was on the floor at the time of Gerry's speech. Thus, it would seem
odd for Gerry to be responding to Butler. On the other hand, Professor Yoo argues that Gerry thought that Sherman was seeking to give
the President the power to declare war (in the sense of declaring war
under international law), and was asserting that he was appalled that
1 30
anyone would suggest that the President should have such a power.
But, as Yoo acknowledges,' 3 1 this reading is based on Gerry's complete misunderstanding of Sherman. Although Sherman's statement
can be read in different ways, there is nothing in Madison's notes that
32
would indicate that Sherman wanted to expand presidential power.'
Neither the pro-Congress nor the pro-Executive reading is necessarily wrong. After all, people misunderstand each other all the time
and they frequently address the comments of someone other than the
previous speaker. But each reading is problematic. And so the record
provided by Madison-both with respect to Gerry's comment and,
more generally, with respect to the debate as a whole-does not tell us
with any certainty what the Convention understood itself to be doing
when it voted eight to two (with one abstention) to substitute "declare" for "make."'1 3 ProfessorJack Rakove has recently suggested an
explanation for the unsatisfying record of this debate.' 3 4 He notes
that the War Powers Clause was discussed toward the end of the pro128
129
130
131

See ELY, supranote 8, at 3.
See Bestor, supra note 14, at 603-04.
See Yoo, supra note 22, at 262-63.
See id. at 262.
132
Philip Bobbitt offers another pro-Executive reading of the text: Gerry is responding to Sherman's appeal for "make," rather than "declare," by suggesting that use of the
word "make" would have the consequence of giving the President the power to declare war
(again, using the term as it is used in international law). Bobbitt, supra note 15, at 1380-81.
But this reading necessarily requires that Gerry engaged in hyperbole and indirection.
Sherman had very clearly not made "a motion to empower the Executive alone to declare
war." 2 Fan-and, supranote 27, at 318.
133 Even the actual vote is unclear, and that is significant as well. Madison indicates
that the original vote was seven in favor, two against, one abstention, and that Ellsworth
changed his vote (and hence Connecticut's vote) when Rufus King said "that 'make' war
might be understood to 'conduct' it which was an Executive function." 2 Farrand, supra
note 27, at 319 n.*. This suggests that, once Ellsworth understood that the change was
needed to make clear that Congress would not have tactical command of the military after
it had authorized combat, he shifted his vote. The official record indicates, in contrast,
that the change was originally defeated 5 to 4, but that on re-vote, it passed eight to one.

See id. at 314. This would suggest that King's comment was not simply important to Ellsworth, but to the critical swing voters. See Lofgren, Understanding,supranote 12, at 676-77;
Yoo, supra note 22, at 264 & n.475.
134
SeeJACK N. RAKoVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE
CONSrITUTION 83-84 (1996).
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ceedings in Philadelphia.13 5 Weary delegates were no longer carefully
articulating their positions, and Madison was no longer carefully re36
cording them.
In addition to arguing that the debates in Philadelphia support
their view, pro-Congress scholars also highlight statements made during the ratification debates in the states, which they believe demonstrate that the power to declare war was the power to initiate
conflict.' 3 7 The most powerful statement from this perspective is one
made by James Wilson at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention:
This [new] system will not hurry us into war; it is calculated to guard
against it. It will not be in the power of a single man, or a single
body of men, to involve us in such distress; for the important power
of declaring war is vested in the legislature at large: this declaration
must be made with the concurrence of the House of Representatives: from this circumstance we may draw a certain conclusion that
13 8
nothing but our national interest can draw us into a war.
As Lofgren writes, in this statement Wilson "not only implicitly
equated declaring war and entering war, but also explicitly foreclosed
exercise of the power by the President acting alone." 13 9 Others at the
state conventions equated Congress's power over war under the Constitution with its power under the Articles of Confederation, and thus
implicitly indicated that Congress was retaining the power to initiate
conflict. As Robert Livingston declared at the New York convention:
"But, say the gentlemen, our present [Articles of Confederation] Congress have not the same powers [as Congress would have under the
Constitution]. I answer, They have the very same... [including] the
power of making war ....
135
136
137

1 40

See id.
See id.

It should be added that, as a matter of constitutional interpretation, these statements are more significant than the statements made during the constitutional convention, although the scholarly controversy about the war power tends to focus on the
Philadelphia debates. To the extent that the founding generation thought original understanding relevant to constitutional interpretation, it was the understanding of the rat~fiers,
who made the Constitution law, not the understanding of the participantsat Philadelphia,
whose deliberations were secret. The classic statement on point is Madison's: "As the instrument came from [the Philadelphia convention], it was nothing more than a draught of
a plan, nothing but a dead letter, until life and validity were breathed into it, by the voice
of the people, speaking through the several state conventions." James Madison, Jay's
Treaty: Speech in the House of Representatives (Apr. 6, 1796), in 16 MADISON PAPERS,
supra note 35, at 296. See also RAKO-'E, supranote 134, at 339-65; Charles A. Lofgren, The
Original Understandingof OriginalIntent, 5 CONSr. COMMENTARY 77 (1988); H. Jefferson
Powell, The Original Understandingof OriginalIntent 98 HARV. L. REv. 885 (1985); Treanor,
JudicialReview, supra note 5, at 544-52.
138 2 Elliot, supra note 107, at 528.
139 Lofgren, Understanding,supra note 12, at 685.
140 2 Elliot, supra note 107, at 278. See also 3 id. at 259 (Madison).
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In contrast, there are apparently no statements in which the term
"declare War" as used in the Constitution is clearly defined by reference to international law. 14' But this absence is far from dispositive.
A number of pro-Congress scholars-although not all142-have acknowledged that their evidence, while probative, is not sufficient to
decide the question. As Lofgren candidly observes of his reading of
the clause, "[O]ne cannot pretend that the matter is beyond all
doubt." 143 Similarly, W. Taylor Reveley III, the author of WarPowersof
the Presidentand Congress, perhaps the most thorough treatment of the
war power, concludes that the records of the Constitutional Convention are "inconclusive" and that they "are not sharpened by available
accounts of the ratification debates."' 44
A number of Antifederalists took the position that the Constitution vested in Congress
the power to initiate war and criticized the Constitution for this reason. For example, at
the Virginia debates Patrick Henry bemoaned the fact that "Congress can both declare war
and carry it on, and levy your money, as long as you have a shilling to pay." Id. at 172. In
making his argument, Henry highlighted the distinction between the United States Constitution and English practice since, under the latter, "[t]he King declares war; the House of
Commons gives the means of carrying it on." Id. at 172. For other examples of Antifederalist objections to the fact that Congress possessed both the powers of purse and sword, see
2 id. at 374-77 (John Lansing, Jr. & Melancton Smith); Richard Henry Lee, Letters of a
FederalFarmer, in PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATFS 279, 291 (Paul
Leicester Ford ed., 1888). These criticisms drew on one of the traditional and fundamental principles of mixed government, which was, as George Mason stated it during the
course of the Constitutional Convention, that "[t]he purse & the sword might never get
into the same hands <whether legislative or executive>." 1 Farrand, supra note 27, at 13940. In response, some Federalists took the position that this reading of the Constitution
was correct, but the concern unfounded. Thus, Oliver Ellsworth asked:
[D]oes it follow, because it is dangerous to give the power of the sword and
purse to an hereditary prince, who is independent of the people, that therefore it is dangerous to give it to the Parliament-to Congress, which is your
Parliament-to men appointed by yourselves, and dependent upon yourselves? This argument amounts to this: you must cut a man in two in the
middle, to prevent his hurting himself.
2 Elliot, supra note 107, at 195. Such statements reflect the view that the decision to declare
war is not simply a decision as to whether hostilities should be classified as a war for purposes of international law. Rather, it is the power of the sword. Similarly, John Marshall
asked: "Are the people of England more secure, if the Commons have no voice in declaring war? or are we less secure by having the Senatejoined with the President?" 3 id. at 233.
Marshall's statement, however, apparently reflects a confusion of the war-making power
and the treaty-making power.
141
See Bestor, supra note 14, at 608 & n.279. Thus, even Professor Yoo, author of the
most careful and complete pro-Executive history, does not offer any examples of this type.
See generallyYoo, supra note 22.
142
Dean Ely, for example, treats the evidence as unambiguous. See ELY, supranote 8,
at 5 (noting "clarity" of original understanding). He has received significant criticism on
this point. See Peter D. Coffnan, Power and Duty: The Languageof the War Power, 80 CORNELL L. REX'. 1236, 1241 n.30 (1995) (reviewing ELY, supra note 8, and finding his discussion of original understanding "peremptory"); Peter J. Spiro, War Powers and the Siren of
Formalism 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1338, 1357 (1993) (reviewing ELY, supra note 8, and attacking
his treatment of original understanding).
143 Lofgren, Understanding,supra note 12, at 697.
144 REVELEY, supra note 14, at 84.
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Not surprisingly, pro-Executive scholars find this evidence unconvincing, in part because only a few speakers equate the power to declare war and the power to initiate conflict, but also because many of
the statements quoted above are unreliable indicia of what the Constitution meant. Thus, Yoo suggests that Livingston's statement equating the new and old Congress's power reflected a "misunderstanding
[that] may have occurred due to a failure to read the new Constitution carefully... ."145 Wilson's statement, in contrast, is clear, and he
was obviously familiar with the Constitution's text as a result of his
service as a delegate at the Philadelphia Convention. It is nonetheless
possible to argue that his statements only reflect his view, and that he
46
is a "dissenter from the prevailing Federalist view on war powers."'
Therefore, Professor Yoo, a sophisticated pro-Executive scholar, argues not that all the Founders thought that the President could initiate war, but that this was the dominant view. 147 Of course, if all that
the pro-Executive camp could do was criticize and minimize the evidence offered by the pro-Congress camp, the case for a pro-Executive
reading of the Clause would not be very substantial-particularly in
view of the absence of statements directly supporting that reading.
But pro-Executive scholars have advanced a strong independent argument: the Founders operated against a background in which there was
a "shared understanding" 148 that the Executive had the power to start
war, and pro-Congress scholars have failed to offer convincing evidence that the Founders departed from that understanding. This argument and the inability of pro-Congress scholars to respond to it or
to another type of evidence that challenges their thesis-evidence
that the President did not have a veto over declarations of war-are
discussed in the next section.
D.

The Case against the Pro-Congress Reading of the War
Powers Clause

Pro-Executive scholars have advanced a number of contextual arguments favoring their reading of the War Powers Clause. Knit together, these arguments powerfully suggest that, in the absence of
some countervailing consideration not previously uncovered by scholars, the Founders would not have given Congress alone the power to
initiate war.
The first point, and the point that has been treated as central by
pro-Executive scholars, has already been discussed. 149 The terms used
145
146
147

Yoo, supra note 22, at 282 n.532.
IL at 287 n.547.
See id.

148
149

Id. at 173.
See supraPart I.B.
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in the War Powers Clause-declarations of war and letters of marque
and reprisal-were terms that had a particular meaning under international law. The power to declare war was a quasi-judicial function,
and letters of marque and reprisal had a limited role. The Founders
knew these meanings and presumably relied on them when they used
these terms. As Dean Rostow explains, "The language... can only be
understood in the setting of international law." 150 "[W]hy," J. Terry
Emerson asks, "if the framers meant to make the Executive no more
than the 'agent' of the Legislature in matters of military affairs, did
they not say so in clear words ...?,,151
Second, English precedent accorded the Executive the power to
initiate war. Professor Yoo writes:
The eighteenth-century English monarch was commander-in-chief
of the armed forces and possessed exclusive power to enter into
treaties, to declare war, and to raise and regulate the army and
navy .... Naturally, then, when the Framers allocated war powers

between the President and Congress, they used as their baseline the
separation of powers they believed to exist between King and
15 2
Parliament.
Third, the writers to whom the Founders looked on separation of
powers matters-John Locke, William Blackstone, and Montesquieu-all believed that the Executive should have responsibility for
15 3
starting and carrying on war.
Fourth, the majority of state constitutions that preceded the Federal Constitution "either assumed that the governors had broad warmaking authority, or explicitly gave them such power in terms reminiscent of the British constitution and the colonial charters."'15 4
Fifth, as former Secretary of State William Rogers has argued, the
Founders believed that the Executive was distinguished by its capacity
to act swiftly, vigorously, and secretly, attributes that they recognized
155
were of peculiar value in the realm of foreign affairs.
Sixth, the Federal Constitution vested in the Executive powers
that the first state constitutions, departing from English and colonial
precedent, had given to the legislature. 15 6 "[A]n impartial review of
the history of this early period," Terry Emerson observes, "reveals that
the attitudes of the majority of persons who wrote the state constituRostow, Once Mor4 supra note 19, at 6.
Emerson, War Powers Resolution, supra note 23, at 209.
152 Yoo, supra note 22, at 217. Colonial governors also had broad military powers,
although, as subordinate crown officials, typically lacked the power to declare war. See id.
at 219-20.
153 See id. at 199-204.
154
Id. at 226.
155 See Rogers, supra note 23, at 1196 & n.10.
156
See Emerson, War Powers Resolution, supra note 23, at 208.
150

151
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tions had undergone a change from an initial dread of the royalty in
the 1770's to a perception of the need for a strong executive by the
57
1780's."'
Taken together, these factors suggest that it would be profoundly
surprising for the Founders to have granted Congress the power to
initiate conflict. For them to believe that such a decision was appropriate, there would have had to have been some concern causing
them to turn against the great tide of constitutional history. In general, the first state constitutions took from the Executive his traditional powers; the Constitution gave them back.1 58 To allocate the
war power to Congress alone would have been directly countercyclical-taking from the Executive a power that was so much a core Executive function that even anti-Executive state constitutions had
allocated it to him.
Moreover, each of the points made by pro-Executive scholars is
historically accurate. The power to start war was historically an Executive function, and this was an allocation supported by the thinkers
who influenced the Founders.
Blackstone was unambiguous in
describing British practice. "[T] he King," he wrote, "has also the sole
prerogative of making war and peace."' 59 "[W]ar is not undertaken
by private persons, but by the will of the whole community; whose
right of willing is in this case transferred to the supreme magistrate by
the fundamental laws of society."' 60 Locke believed that this was the
proper assignment of the power,' 6' and Montesquieu similarly assigned to the Executive the power to start and conduct war.' 6 2 The
157
158
159
160
161

Id.
See id. at 207.
1 WILiAM BLACKrSTONE, COMMENTARIES *249.
Id. at *250.

In Chapter XII of his Second Treatise of Government, Locke divided governmental
power in a commonwealth into three parts: legislative, executive, and federative. SeeJOHN
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT bk.II, §§ 143-48 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge University Press 1960) (1690). The federative power encompassed relations between the commonwealth and all persons and entities outside of it. See id. at bk.II, §145. "[T]he power of
War and Peace" was part of the federative power. See id. at bk.II, § 146. Locke contended
that the federative power should be exercised by the executive:
Though, as I said, the Executive and FederativePowerof every Community be
really distinct in themselves, yet they are hardly to be separated, and placed,
at the same time, in the hands of distinct Persons. For both of them requiring the force of the society for their exercise, it is almost impracticable to
place the Force of the Commonwealth in distinct, and not subordinate
hands; or that the Executive and FederativePowershould be placed in Persons
that might act separately, whereby the Force of the Publick would be under
different Commands: which would be apt sometime or other to cause disorder and ruine.
Id. at bk.II, § 148.
162 Montesquieu divided governmental power into three parts: "the legislative; the executive in respect to things dependent on the law of nations; and the executive, in regard
to things that depend on the civil laws." MONTESQUIEu, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS bk. XI, ch. 6,
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Founders also recognized that the President possessed certain attributes of obvious value in war. As Hamilton explained, "Decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch will generally characterise the proceedings
of one man, in a much more eminent degree, than the proceedings of
any greater number .... -163
It is also true that the first state constitutions, enacted in the initial flush of independence, had vested in the legislatures powers traditionally held by the Executive. 16 4 This system of governance gave
many of the Framers an appreciation of the importance of limiting
legislative power. Accordingly, as Gordon Wood observed, the Federal Constitution represented a "repudiation"' 65 of the first state constitutions because the Federal Constitution gave the President
traditional executive functions which the state governors had been denied. 166 There is, however, a complicating factor regarding the proExecutive trend that pro-Executive scholars have not addressed:
although it is true that the first state constitutions gave the Governor
substantial authority over war matters, the later constitutions, surprisingly, assigned the Governor less such power. For example, South
Carolina and Virginia, the two states that in the 1770s enacted constitutions with clauses specifically allocating war power, involved the
Governor in the exercise of that power. 167 Virginia's 1786 constitupara. 1 (David Wallace Carrithers ed., University of California Press 1977). Although
Chapter 6 is headed "Of the Constitution of England," examination of the text shows that
Montesquieu is not merely describing the English system of Government, but prescribing
the proper governmental framework. See ANNE M. COHLER, MONTESQUIEU'S COMPARATIVE
POLITICS AND THE SPIRIT OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 104 (1988). The first category of
executive power encompassed the power to "mak[e ] peace or war." MONTESQUIEU, supra
at bk. XI, ch. 6, para. 21.
163 THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 472 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
Hamilton's recognition that the Executive possessed these attributes was in accordance
with the standard formulation. See, e.g., 1 Farrand, supra note 27, at 140 (Dickinson)
(proper attributes of executive include "[s]ecrecy, vigor & despatch [sic]" and "responsibility"); James Iredell, Answers to Mr. Mason's Objections, in PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES 351, 352 (Paul Ford ed., 1888) ("One of the great advantages attending a single Executive power is the degree of secrecy and dispatch with which on
critical occasions such a power can act.").
164
See FORRFST McDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTEL.ECTUAL ORIGINS OF
THE CONSTITUTION 86 (1985).
165
GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 519
(1969).
166
See id. at 521.
167 South Carolina's 1776 constitution stated, "[T]he president and commander-inchief shall have no power to make war or peace ... without the consent of the general
assembly and legislative council." S.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XXVI. The state's 1778 constitution also provided that the governor "shall have no power to commence war" without
legislative approval. S.C. CONST. of 1778 art. XXXIII. Likewise, Virginia's 1776 constitution gave the governor power to "make war" as advised by his executive council. VA.
CONST. of 1776, pt. i, § xi. Vermont, although not recognized as a state at the time, passed
a constitution containing a similar provision. VT. CONST. of 1777, § xviii.
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tion was similar.1 68 However, the two other state constitutions from
the 1780s that contained provisions concerning starting war-the
Maryland Constitution of 1780 and the New Hampshire Constitution
16 9
of 1784-gave the power to initiate war to the legislature alone.
Moreover, the Massachusetts Constitution, despite the fact that it generally created a strong Executive, gave the legislature the power to
appoint army and navy officers. 170 Thus, the history of the revolutionary era state constitutions suggests that treatment of war functions was
counter-cyclical to the overall trend in separation of powers.
This point supports a pro-Congress reading of the War Powers
Clause, but it is hardly conclusive. It merely leads us back to the larger
question created by the factors stressed in pro-Executive scholarship:
Why might the Framers, at a time in which they were taking so many
powers from the Legislature, give Congress alone the power to start
war? In explaining why the Founders gave the power to initiate war to
Congress, pro-Congress scholars have highlighted a simple explanation. In the words of Dean Ely, requiring congressional approval
before the nation went to war, reflected "a determination not to let
such decisions be taken easily."' 71 Similarly, Professors Firmage and
Wormuth observed, "The legislative branch was purposely given the
war power as a check upon the impulsive use of military force by the
executive," 172 and Professor Bickel argued that "the Framers of the
Constitution intended ...to make it harder [to start wars]."'t7Pro-Congress scholars point to a number of statements made by
the Founders as an indication that, because the Founders believed
presidents would be war-prone, they designed the Constitution to
make war less likely by circumventing the Executive and granting Congress sole warmaking power. As previously noted, Wilson wrote that
"[t]his system will not hurry us into war .... It will not be in the
power of a single man.., to involve us in such distress... ."174 Similarly, Madison wrote Jefferson: "The constitution supposes, what the
History of all... [Governments] demonstrates, that the Ex[ecutive] is
the branch of power most interested in war, and most prone to it. It
has accordingly with studied care, vested the question of war in the
168

SeeVA. CONST. of 1786, ch. ii,
art. xi (Governor to "make war" as advised by Execu-

tive Council).
169 See MD. CONST. of 1780, ch. ii, art. vii; N.H. CONST.of 1784, pt. ii, cl.10.
170 See MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. II, ch. I, 4, art. 1. For a discussion of this Massachusetts clause, see Flaherty, supra note 31, at 1770.
171 Ei.y, supra note 8, at 3.
172

WORMUTH ETiAL., supra note 14, at 179.

173 Bickel, supra note 7, at 131-32.
174 2 Elliot, supra note 107, at 528. For use of this quote as support for a pro-Congress
reading of the war power, see, e.g., WomamuH Er Ai-, supra note 14, at 30.

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

724

[Vol. 82:695

Legisl[ature].,u 75 Jefferson wrote Madison that the system gave an "effectual check to the Dog of war,"' 76 and early treatise-writer William
Rawle opined that "every possible precaution should be used before a
1 77
nation is plunged into [war]."
Yet the question remains why the Founders would have thought
this an area in which the President was less prudent than Congressgiven that they repeatedly stated in a range of other contexts that it
was legislative abuses of power that most needed to be guarded
against.17 8 Moreover, why did they think that the path to war had to
be slowed? Perhaps because most of the pro-Congress literature is
shaped by an explicit or unstated view that the war in Vietnam was a
tragic mistake, 179 it is typically assumed that the Founders would have
wanted to avoid war. But the Founders themselves engaged in warfare
with some frequency. Not only had the new republic fought successfully for independence in the Revolutionary War, but before it was
twenty-five years old, it had engaged in a series of wars with Native
Americans; launched military actions against the Barbary states; and
fought the world's two most formidable military powers-France, in
the undeclared naval "Quasi-War" of 1798 to 1800, and Great Britain,
in the War of 1812.180 Given early America's apparent proclivity for
armed conflict, it cannot simply be assumed that, even if the Founders
thought the' President was particularly likely to lead the nation into
war, they would have thought such inclination was a bad thing. Thus,
some explanation is required as to why they would have thought that
the President was too likely to lead the nation to war.
This Part has so far focused on the evidentiary weaknesses of the
pro-Congress reading of the Constitution. However, one significant
evidentiary problem undermines the positions advanced by both proCongress and pro-Executive scholars: the fact that relevant evidence
strongly indicates that the predominant view was that the President
did not have the power to veto declarations of war. Early statements
about the War Powers Clause repeatedly feature the assertion that the
decision to declare war is Congress's alone, and that the Executive has
175

Letter from James Madison to ThomasJefferson (Apr. 2, 1798), in 2 THE REPUBLIC

OF LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THOMASJEFFERSON ANDJAMES MADISON 1776-

1826, at 1031, 1032 (James Morton Smith ed., 1995) [hereinafter REPUBLIC OF LETTERS].
For use of these quotes, see, e.g., ELY, supra note 8, at 3-4.
176 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 1 REPUBLIC OF
LETTERS, supra note 175, at 631, 635.
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109 (2d ed. 1829).
178 See, e.g., THE FEDERA.LST No. 48, at 334-38 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961); THE FEDERALIST No. 71, at 483-84 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961). See also RhovE,supra note 134, at 309-16.
179 See Bobbitt, supra note 15, at 1373.
180 See SOFAER, supra note 14, at 131-66, 208-24, 279-336.
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no role in the matter. For example, in 1793 George Washington
wrote, "The Constitution vests the power of declaring war in Congress;
therefore no offensive expedition of importance can be undertaken
until after they have deliberated upon the subject and authorized
such a measure."' 81 During the same year, James Madison similarly
declared that it was "the simple, the received and the fundamental
doctrine of the constitution, that the power to declare war ... is fully
and exclusively vested in the legislature; that the executive has no right,
in any case to decide the question, whether there is or is not cause for
declaring war .... ,"182 Furthermore, while President, Jefferson acknowledged that "Congress alone is constitutionally invested with the
power of changing our condition from peace to war."18 3 In fact, Chief
Justice Marshall ruled that "It]he whole powers of war being, by the
constitution of the United States, vested in congress, the-acts of that
body can alone be resorted to as our guides in this inquiry [of whether
'war' existed].184
Also significant are PresidentJohn Adams's actions regarding the
Quasi-War with France and the legislature's response to them. In
1798, the Federalist congressional caucus debated whether to seek a
vote of Congress declaring war against France-a declaration that Adams, a Federalist, opposed. Adams's position against a declaration of
war; the motions on the floor of Congress in favor of a declaration of
war; and the abandonment of those motions after the caucus's vote
not to pursue war have been frequently discussed. 18 5 Strikingly, there
(Jared Sparks
ed., 1836).
182 "Helvidius"Number 4, supra note 35, at 106, 108.
183 ANNALS OF CONG., 9th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (Dec. 1805).
184 Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 28 (1801). See also United States v. Smith,
27 F. Cas. 1192, 1230-31 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1806) (No. 16,342) (power to make war "exclusively
vested in congress"). The one proponent of a different view of the War Powers Clause was
St. George Tucker. In his appendix to Blackstone's Commentaries, Tucker wrote, "With us
the representatives of the people have the right to decide this'important question [whether
to declare warJ, conjunctively with the supreme executive who may, on this occasion as on
every other, (except a proposal to amendment the constitution,) exercise a qualified negative on the joint resolutions of congress ... ." ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARiES (1803), excerpted in 3 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 101, 102 (Phillip B. Kurland &
181

GEORGE WASHINGTON, 10 THE WRITINGS Or GEORGE WASHINGTON 367

Ralph Lerner eds., 1987). Tucker's statement indicates that there was not a consensus on
the question of whether the President had a veto over the power to declare war. Moreover,
Tucker was a prominentjudge, legal educator, and lawyer, so his opinion deserves weight.
At the same time, he had not been a member of the Philadelphia convention or his state
ratifying convention, and, as indicated in the text, the predominant view was that the Congress alone had responsibility for determining whether war was declared. For information
on Tucker's career, see CHARLES T. CULLEN, ST. GEORGE TUCKER AND LAW IN VIRGINIA,
1772-1804, at 186-89 (1987); Treanor, Judkial Review, supra note 5, at 520-21.
185 For leading secondary accounts, see ALEXANDER DECONDE, THE QUASI-WAR: THE
POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY OF THE UNDECLARED WAR WITH FRANCE,

1797-1801, at 103-141

(1966); BRADFORD PERKINS, 1 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS:

THE CREATION OF A REPUBLICAN EMPIRE, 1776-1865, at 105-07 (Warren I. Cohen ed., 1993);
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is no mention in any of this material of the possibility of a presidential
veto of a congressional decision to declare war. This implies that it
was understood that the President did not have the power to veto declarations of war. Presumably, if anyone thought that the President
had such veto power, that fact would have entered into the discussions
of whether Congress should declare war over the President's opposition. Furthermore, when Congress debated whether to declare war,
numerous legislators stated that the decision whether to go to war was
Congress's alone. For example, Congressman Sitgreaves declared:
The House know[s] that, by the distribution of powers under this
Government, it is only competent for Congress to declare the country in war; therefore, until that declaration is made by this department, the Executive and Judiciary cannot act in the same way as if
18 6
the country was at war.
Made in the teeth of presidential opposition, such statements strongly
suggest a belief that the President had no role of any kind-including
a veto-in the decision whether to declare war.
Moreover, in his 1812 message asking Congress for a declaration
of war, President Madison made clear that the decision about whether
to declare war was, under the Constitution, purely a matter for
Congress:
Whether the United States shall continue passive under these
progressive usurpations and these accumulating wrongs, or, opposing force to force in defense of their national rights, shall commit a
just cause into the hands of the Almighty Disposer of Events ... is a
solemn question which the Constitution wisely confides to the legislative department of the Government. In recommending it to their
early deliberations I am happy in the assurance that the decision
will be worthy the enlightened and patriotic councils of a virtuous, a
free, and a powerful nation. 187

SoFAR±, supranote 14, at 144-45. Adams provides two additional accounts of the incident,
one full and one partial. SeeJohn Adams, To the Printersof the Boston Patriot [hereinafter
Boston Patriot], in 9 THE WORKS OFJOHN ADAMS 241, 304-05 (Charles Francis Adams ed.,

1854) [hereinafter ADAMS WORKS] (full account of 1809); id. at 305 n.1 (fragment account
of 1801).
186 ANNALS OF CONG., 5th Cong., 2117 (July 1798). See also id. at 1321 (Congressman
Baldwin: "[T]he subject seemed to be placed wholly in the hands of the Legislature."); id.
at 1324 (referring to statement of Congressman Nicholas: "[H]e had never heard it
doubted that Congress had the power over the progress of what led to war, as well as the
power of declaring war."); id. at 1336 (referring to statement of Congressman Pinckney:
"Mr. P. agreed that this was Legislative power, and not Executive.").
187 James Madison, Message to the Senate and House of Representatives (June 1,
1812), in 2 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 484, 489-90
(James D. Richardson ed., 1897) [hereinafter COMPILATION].
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The day after Congress voted to declare war, Madison issued "A Proclamation," which asserted that the United States was in a state of war
because of congressional action:
Whereas the Congress of the United States, by virtue of the
constituted authority vested, in them,. have declared by their act
bearing date the 18th day of the present month that war exists between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and the
dependencies thereof and the United States of America and their
Territories ....

"8

Surprisingly, given the wealth of literature on the original intent
of the War Powers Clause, no scholar has argued that the original
understanding was that the President could not veto a declaration of
war. This is particularly striking because modem scholars have argued on textualist grounds that the War Powers Clause means precisely
what it says-that "Congress shall have power... To declare War"and the President cannot veto such declarations. 8 9 Only two scholars, Dean Ely and Gregory Sidak, have even raised the possibility that
the original understanding was that the President could not veto declarations of war, and they dismiss the possibility rapidly.'9 0 Instead,
they argue on purely textual ground that declarations of war fall
within Article I, Section 7, Clause 3 of the Constitution, the Presentment Clause, which requires that every congressional "Order, Resolution, or Vote" be presented to the President for his signature or
veto.' 9 1 The problem with this argument is that the Framers understood the Presentment Clause narrowly. That is, if all congressional
orders, resolutions, and votes must be presented to the President, this
presumably applies, not just to declarations of war, but also to congressional proposals for constitutional amendments. However, in the
1798 case Hollingsworth v. Virginia,192 the one early Presentment
Clause case, the Supreme Court rejected the claim that the Eleventh
188

James Madison, A Proclamation(June 12, 1812), in 2

COMPILATION,

supra note 187,

at 497.
189
For the most complete argument on point, see Carter, supranote 26, at 129-32. See
also Bobbitt, supranote 15, at 1385 n.69 ("[I] t seems clear from the language of the Constitution that the President cannot veto a declaration .... ").
190 See ELY, supra note 8, at 231 n.21; Gregory Sidak, To Declare War, 41 DuKE LJ. 27, 84
(1991).
191 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3. In its entirety, the clause reads:
Every Order, Resolution, or Vote, to Which the Concurrence of the Senate
and House of Represeritatives may be necessary (except on a question of
Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States; and
before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of
Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the
Case of a Bill.
Id.
192 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 378 (1798).
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Amendment was invalid because it had not been signed by the President. The Court observed that the Presentment Clause "applies only
to the ordinary cases of legislation ... .- 193 A congressional declaration of war, like a congressional decision to propose amendments,
would seem to fall outside the category of "ordinary cases of
legislation."
The other principal piece of evidence on which Ely and Sidak
rely is that Madison signed the declaration of war against England
which Congress passed in 1812.194 But Presidents sign documents for
political reasons-even when they know the signature has no legal
consequence-in order to highlight a personal endorsement. For example, despite Hollingsworth, on the eve of the Civil War, President
Buchanan signed the congressionally-approved Corwin Amendment,
which would have barred subsequent amendments banning slavery,' 95
and President Lincoln signed the Thirteenth Amendment after it was
approved by Congress in 1865.196 The real question is not whether
Madison signed the declaration, but what significance he attached to
that signing. Evidence of Madison's intent can be found in his previously-quoted message to Congress and his proclamation following the
declaration of war. Neither document is discussed by Ely or Sidak.
Both documents, however, clearly state that the decision whether to
go to war is purely congressional. According to Madison's war
message, "[T]he Constitution wisely confides [the decision about
whether to go to war] to the legislative department of the Government." 9 7 And, according to Madison's proclamation, "[The Members of] Congress . . . have declared [war] by their act."' 98 The
President is not part of the process. Ely's and Sidak's position is further undercut by the evidence concerning the 1798 controversy over
whether to go to war with France (a subject that neither discusses). 199
That previous commentators-both pro-Congress and pro-Executive-have not even raised the issue of a presidential veto may reflect
the fact that, under either view of the original understanding, it would
make no sense for the President to be without veto power. If the
Founders sought to ensure that the President was intimately involved
in all matters of foreign policy, as pro-Executive scholars maintain, he
193

Id. at 381 n.*.

194

See ELY, supra note 8, at 231 n.21; Sidak, supra note 190, at 84.

195

See RICHARD B. BERNSTEIN & JEROME AGEL, AMENDING AMERICA: IF WE LoVE THE

CONSTITUTION So MUCH, WHY Do WE KEEP TRYING TO CHANGE IT? 91 (1993).

196

See id. at 100.

197 Madison, Message to the Senate and House of Representatives, supra note 187, at
490. See also supra text accompanying note 186.
198 Madison, A Proclamation, supra note 188, at 497. See also supra text accompanying
note 187.

199

See supra text accompanying notes 185-86.
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should obviously have been equipped with veto power over warmaking
decisions. Similarly, if the Founders sought to slow the path to war by
constructing all possible barriers to war, as pro-Congress scholars
maintain, a presidential veto would be one obvious barrier.
The remainder of this Article seeks to answer the question posed
in this Part: Why would the Founders have given Congress the power
to initiate war at the same time they denied the President a veto over
those declarations? There are several reasons why the Founders
might not have wanted to give the President much, if any, power over
the decision whether to go to war. In addition, examination of the
Founders' writings suggests that the continuing power of English oppositionist thought likely influenced the structuring of the War Powers Clause. That ideology made the Founders particularly fearful that
unconstrained Executive control of the military would enable the
President to seize power directly or to undermine the system of government indirectly through his use of patronage and the financial assets at his disposal.2 0 0 However, this factor was at least as much a
concern at the start of the Revolution as it was at the time of the Federal Constitution, yet to the extent that they dealt with the matter, the
first state constitutions involved the Governor in the warmaking decision.20 1 Therefore, an additional explanation is needed for why the
Founders might have become convinced that the President should be
excluded from the decision to go to war, even as he was being reinvested with so many powers. In offering such an explanation, this
Article will turn to a topic whose relationship to the War Powers
Clause has gone wholly unexplored-the Framers' conception of
fame.
II
FAME

In his 1967 essay, Fame and the FoundingFathers, Douglass Adair
advanced the novel argument that the Framers' conception of fame
played a critical role in shaping their actions.2 02 Adair began by contrasting the "explosion of [political] talent" in late eighteenth century
America with the comparative dearth of such talent in the modern
United States.2 03 He noted that the nation that produced "a Hamil200 For a detailed discussion of these concerns, see WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONsTrrUrTIONs: REPUBLICAN IDEOLOGY AND THE MAKING OF THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS
INTHE REVOLUrIONARY ERA 10, 274 (Rita & Robert Kimber trans., 1980); CHARLES ROYSTER,
A REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLE AT WAR: THE CONTINENTAL ARMY AND AMERICAN CHARACTER,

1775-1783, at 35-38 (1979).
201 See supra text accompanying notes 164-66.
202 See ADAIR, supra note 32.
203

Id. at 5.
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ton, a Dickinson, a Rutledge, and the galaxy of great Virginians" had a
population "slightly less than that of Wisconsin."'20 4 He added:
Virginia in 1790, the largest of the states, contained just over seven
hundred thousand people, if one counts the slaves as well as free
inhabitants; but this state, which produced Washington, Mason,
Henry, Jefferson, Madison, Marshall, had a total white population,
including women and children, of about four hundred thousand
souls. This is much smaller in number than such modern spawning
genius as the Wilkes-Barre metropolitan area or
grounds of political
20 5
Arizona.
Phoenix,
These comparisons suggested an obvious question: "How can we account for this amazing concentration of political ability in this genera20 6
tion born into a tiny nation on the fringe of the Atlantic?"
The answer lies in the fact that "lust for the psychic reward of
fame, honor, glory, after 1776 be[came] a key ingredient in the behavior of Washington and his greatest contemporaries." 20 7 Following
eighteenth century usage, Adair defined fame as:
the action or behavior of a "great man," who stands out, who towers
above his fellows in some spectacular way. To be famous or renowned means to be widely spoken of by a man's contemporaries
and also to act in such a way that posterity remembers his name and
his actions.... The love of fame encourages a man to make history,
to leave the mark of his deeds and his ideals on the world; it incites
a man to refuse to be the victim of events and to become an "eventmaking" personality-a being never to be forgotten by those later
generations that will be born into a world his actions helped to
shape. 208
Desiring to be remembered, the Framers became great.
Three reasons explain why this desire for fame was particularly
powerful among the framing generation. Part of the reason was cultural. The writers they read-classical authors such as Plutarch, Cicero, and Aristotle, as well as more modern authors such as Machiavelli
and Francis Bacon-celebrated fame and its pursuit and deemed
fame an appropriate measure of individual worth. Aristotle declared,
"'Honor and dishonor are the matters with which the high-minded
man is especially concerned.' "209 Francis Bacon opined, "'[The] win2 10
ning of Honour is but the revealing of a man's virtue and worth.'
And these authors placed the founders of states and the legislators
204
205
206
207
208
209
210

Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

4.

5.

8.
11.
12 n.8 (quoting Aristotle).
14 (quoting Bacon).
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who created perfect constitutions at, or near, the apex of justly-won
fame. Thus, Plutarch provided as a model for emulation the "great
21
LAWGIVER and the FOUNDER OF A COMMONWEALTH."
Machiavelli found "'the Founders of a Republic"' to be the most
praiseworthy individuals, except for "'the authors and founders of religions.' 2 1 2 Bacon declared the individuals most worthy of fame to be
the "'FOUNDERS OF STATES AND COMMONWEALTHS[,] such as
'2 1 3
...Romulus, Cyrus, Ottoman, and Julius Caesar.'
Second, Adair contended that many of the Framers had no faith
in a heavenly afterlife.2 1 4 Fame was important to them because it offered them what religion no longer could: immortality. " [W] e must
recognize," Adair wrote, "[that] the hope of fame like the hope of
Christian immortality is a mode for dealing with proud Death and
2 15
conquering him."
Finally, the Founders became obsessed with fame because the
Revolutionary War proved that great fame was attainable. Despite
their generally high ambition, the Founders nonetheless had limited
aspirations before the war. "'When I was young,"' Adams wrote Jefferson in 1813, "'the Summum Bonum in Massachusetts was to be worth
ten thousand pounds Sterling, ride in a Chariot, be a Colonel of a
Regiment of Militia and hold a seat in his Majesty's Council. No
21 6
Man's Imagination aspired to anything higher beneath the skies."'
Even Hamilton, one of the few Founders who dreamt of personal
glory years before the Revolution, dreamt almost modestly: he
fantasized about following in the steps of General James Wolfe who
won immortality, a great victory for his country, and death on the
Plains of Abraham.2 1 7 The Revolution opened previously unimaginable horizons. According to Adair, "As the War for Independence enlarges the provincial stage upon which they act their roles to that of a
world theater, the greatest of the great generation develop an almost
obsessive desire for fame. They become fantastically concerned with
posterity's judgment of their behavior."2 1 8 And so, to take two examples, Adams came to develop "a sort of pathology of 'the love of
fame"' 2 1 9 while Hamilton became consumed with a "demonic passion

211
212

213
214

Id. at 13 (citing Plutarch).
Id. at 15 n.12 (quoting Machiavelli).
Id. at 14-15 (quoting Bacon).
See id. at 12.

215

Id.

216
217

Id. at 6 (quotingJohn Adams).
See id. at 7.

218

Id.

219

Id. at 3.
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for fame," 220 and adopted a somewhat grander role model than
22
Wolfe: Julius Caesar. '
Thus, Adair concludes that the Founders' desire for fame made
222
possible national independence and the creation of the republic.
Their concern for immortality "bec[a]me[ ] a spur and a goad that
urge [d] some of them to act with a nobleness and greatness that their
2 23
earlier careers had hardly hinted at."
Although a number of historians and students of the Founding
Fathers have explored Adair's insight,22 4 legal scholars have mistakenly ignored it, despite the wealth of writings on original intent. The
same concern with fame that Adair saw as guiding the personal actions of the Founders also profoundly influenced their thinking about
governance. "[L]ove of fame," Hamilton wrote, is "the ruling passion
of the noblest minds, which would prompt a man to plan and undertake extensive and arduous enterprises for the public benefit."2 2 5
"[L]ove of fame,' declared Gouverneur Morris at the constitutional
convention, "is the great spring to noble & illustrious actions." 22 6
"The love of honest and well earned fame is deeply rooted in honest
and susceptible minds," James Wilson asserted. 22 7 He then rhetorically asked,
Can there be a stronger incentive to the operations of this passion,
than the hope of becoming the object of well founded and distinguishing applause? Can there be a more complete gratification of
this passion, than the satisfaction of knowing that this applause is
given-that it is given upon the most honourable principles, and
22 8
acquired by the most honourable pursuits?
220
221
222

Id. at 16 n.14.
See id. at 16.
See id. at 8.

223 Id.
224 For works that follow Adair in exploring the influence of the concept of fame on
the Founders, see RICHARD BROOKHISER, FOUNDING FATHER: REDISCOVERING GEORGE WASHINGTON (1996); MICHAEL LENESCH, NEw ORDER OF THE AGES: TIME, THE CONSTITUTION,
AND THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT (1988); PAUL A. RAHE, REPuBLICS ANCIENT AND MODERN: CLASSICAL REPUBLICANISM AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
(1992); GARRY WILLS, CINCINNATUS: GEORGE WASHINGTON AND THE AMERICAN ENLIGHTEN-

MENT (1984); Bruce Miroff, John Adams: Merit, Fame, and PoliticalLeadership, 48 J. POL. 116
(1986). For a history of "fame" through the ages, see LEO BRAUDY, THE FRENZY OF RENOWN:
FAME & ITS HISTORY (1986).
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226
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THE FEDERALIST No. 72, at 488 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
2 Farrand, supra note 27, at 53.
1 THE WORKS OFJAMES WILSON 405 (Robert Green McCloskey ed., 1967).
Id. Wilson also wrote:

The love of reputation and the fear of dishonour are, by the all-gracious
Author of our existence, implanted in our breasts, for purposes the most
beneficent and wise. Let not these principles be deemed the growth of
dispositions only which are weak or vain; they flourish most luxuriantly in
minds, the strongest and, let me add, the most humble.

2 id. at 593.
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John Adams observed that "if the citizens, or a majority of them, or
any party or individual of them, in action and practice, preferred the
public to their private interest, as many undoubtedly would, it would
not be from any such passion as love of the democracy." Such a preference was instead likely rooted in "a desire of fame, and the ap'229
plause, gratitude, and rewards of the public.
At the same time, the Framers did not see the desire for fame as
wholly beneficial. Their conception of a "passion" for fame followed
David Hume's approach. In classifying the "love of fame" as a "passion," Hume conceived of the attraction of fame as emotional rather
than rational in nature, and he therefore broke with the classical celebration of the quest for fame. 230 Thus, for the Framers, while love of
fame could inspire individuals to serve the polity, it also could harm,
and even endanger, when not properly channeled and constrained.
Although the proper future audience was the wise and good, an individual, fearful of being forgotten, might care more about simply being
remembered, rather than by whom or for what. The haunting example from antiquity of Herostratus burning down the beautiful Temple
of Diana at Ephesus so that his memory would be immortal23 ' teaches
that the desire for such immortality can triumph over concern for
others. Adams was cognizant of this danger when he wrote:
With what impatience does the man of spirit and ambition, who is
depressed by his situation, look round for some great opportunity
to distinguish himself? No circumstances, which can afford this appear to him undesirable; he even looks forward with satisfaction to
the prospect of foreign war, or civil dissension; and with secret
transport and delight, sees, through all the confusion and bloodshed which attend them, the probability of those wished-for occasions presenting themselves, in which he may draw upon himself
23 2
the attention and admiration of mankind.
Hamilton, too, warned of the dangers posed by the "man of irregular
23 3
ambition" driven by his love of fame and power.
Furthermore, the Founders did not consider their peers immune
from the corruption caused by love of fame. For example, when Hamilton, after dinner with Jefferson one evening in 1791, declared, "The
greatest man that ever lived, was Julius Caesar," Jefferson concluded,
229

John Adams, A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States,

in 6 ADAMS WORKS, supra note 185, at 210 [hereinafter Adams, Defence].
230 See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HuMAN NATURE 316-24 (LA. Selby-Bigge ed., 1888)

(discussing "love of fame" in the section of the book on "Passions"). For a discussion of the
influence of Hume on the Founders with respect to their conception of fame, see RAHE,
supra note 224, at 565-66.
231
See BRAuiy, supra note 224, at 51.
232 John Adams, Discourses on Davila; A Series of Papers on Political History, in 6
ADAMS WORKS, supra note 185, at 260 [hereinafter Adams, Davila].
233
THE FEDERALIST No. 72, supra note 225, at 340 (Alexander Hamilton).
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as he wrote Benjamin Rush, that Hamilton intended to overthrow the
23 4 Fitgovernment in order to achieve a place in history like Caesar's.
tingly, a few months later Rush received a letter from Adams accusing
Jefferson of illegitimately pursuing glory. Adams wrote: "The Declaration of Independence I always considered as a theatrical show. Jefferson ran away with all the stage effect of that.., and all the glory of
it."235 As Leo Braudy has explained, "It is impossible to read the letters and sometimes even the public statements of virtually any one of
the Founding Fathers without quickly finding an attack on one or several of the others for their ambition, their greed for praise, their van'236
ity, and so on.
Thus, a crucial problem in structuring government became how
to control the desire for fame and renown. In his Discourses on Davila,
Adams observed, "The desire of the esteem of others is as real a want
of nature as hunger. ' 23 7 He added, "It is a principal end of government to regulate this passion, which in its turn becomes a principal
means of government. ' 238 Returning to the subject later in the book,
the future President quoted with approval Adam Smith's observation,
"To those who have been accustomed to the possession, or even to the
hope of public admiration, all other pleasures sicken and decay," and
then framed his discussion around a question posed by the poetJohnson: "Heroes proceed! What bonds your pride shall hold?" "The answer," Adams wrote, "can be none other than this, that, as nature has
established in the bosoms of heroes no limits to those passions; and as
the world, instead of restraining, encourages them, the check must be
in the form of government. '23 9 Adams's choice of language is significant. Government does not seek to root out the desire for applause; it
seeks only to "check" it, to "regulate" it, to convert it into "a principal
means of government." Similarly, in discussing the proper response
to a person's "love of fame," Hamilton urged that it be harnessed, not
eradicated: "[T] he desire of reward is one of the strongest incentives
of human conduct, [and] the best security for the fidelity of mankind
240
is to make their interest coincide with their duty."

According to one important group of scholars, the Founders of
the Constitution concluded that individuals inevitably pursued eco234

See ADAIR, supranote 32, at 13-14 (quoting from letter written by Thomas Jefferson

to Benjamin Rush datedJan. 16, 1811) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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1805-1813, at 180, 182 (John A. Schutz &
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236 BRAUDY, supranote 224, at 455-56.
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nomic self-interest, and therefore the Founders sought to create a system of governance that would channel that drive in a beneficial
fashion and contain it when it posed a harm to the polity.2 4 1 In Creation of the American Republic, the most influential work of this school of
thought, Gordon Wood contended that this acceptance of the pursuit
of economic self-interest as legitimate (or at least as an unavoidable
aspect of human nature) marked a sharp departure from the republicanism that had been the dominant mode of thought at the start of
the Revolutionary Era.2 42 In republicanism, a principal, and perhaps
the principal, purpose of the polity was to inculcate virtue-the sacrifice of individual interest to the commonweal.243 According to Wood,
the Framers decisively rejected this view and accepted liberalism.2 44
Similarly, in Democracy and The Federalist, a classic explication of the
view that the Founders accepted self-interest as part of the constitutional system, Martin Diamond argued that Madison saw "the real
problem in popular government... [as] the majority faction, i.e., the
great mass of the little propertied and unpropertied. ' 245 FederalistNo.
10, according to Diamond, is premised on the view that this threat
could not be resolved by an appeal to "'moral and religious motives'
whose efficacy [Madison] deprecated. ' 24 6 Rather, it was to be mastered by pitting economic interest against economic interest. "[T] he
struggle of interests is a safe, even energizing, struggle which is compatible with, or even promotes, the safety and stability of society." 24 7
Thus, the Founders solved "the problem posed by the dangerous passions and interests of the many... primarily by a reliance upon pas248
sion and interest themselves."
More recent scholarship-including new work by Wood 249-has
indicated that the story of ideological transformation that Wood depicted in Creation of the American Republic was too stark and that, while
241
See, e.g., DREW R. McCoy, THE ELUSIVE REPUBLIC: POLITICAL ECONOMY INJEFFERSONIAN AMERICA 120-35 (1980); McDONALD, supra note 164, at 188-89; WOOD, supranote 165,

at 606-15; William Michael Treanor, Note, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just
Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment 94 YALE LJ. 694, 695-700, 704-05 (1985).
242 See WOOD, supra note 165, at 606-15. For a discussion of Wood's influence, see
Daniel T. Rogers, Republicanism: The Career of a Concept, 79J. AM. HiST. 11, 15-24 (1992);
Treanor, Takings Clause, supra note 5, at 819-24.
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republicanism grew less influential, it was still important at the time of
the framing. For example, Isaac Kramnick has written:
Federalists and Antifederalists ...tapped several languages of politics ....None dominated the field, and the use of one was compatible with the use of another by the same writer or speaker. There
was a profusion and confusion of political tongues among the founders. They lived easily with that clatter; it is we, two hundred and
2 50
more years later, who chafe at their inconsistency.
There is currently a broad (although not universal) acceptance
among historians of the view that, at the time of the founding, both
republican and liberal ideas were widely held and that both affected
constitutional discourse. 2 5 1 Thus, the Framers were concerned both
2 52
with harnessing self-interest and with promoting virtue.
The Founders' comments about fame and glory are in accord
with this account, suggesting parallels between the Constitution's
treatment of economic self-interest and its treatment of the desire for
fame. In the classical republican vision, the desire for fame was an
unmitigated good: "the noblest of the passions." 253 The attitude of
the Founders towards fame represents a tempering-but not a rejection-of this initial vision through the collective experience of a famous generation. Thus, the Founders had a complex view of fame,
seeing it as an impetus for great deeds and as an impetus for great
harms; fame was both a manifestation of virtue and a possible threat
to the polity. The Constitution the Founders created reflects this
complexity. It seeks to facilitate the pursuit of fame, to harness the
pursuit of fame and to check the pursuit of fame-all at the same
time.
The Constitution reflects this strategy in a number of different
ways. For example, Hamilton invoked the love of fame as a reason not
to bar presidential re-election. The bar would "deter" the President
from beginning large-scale enterprises "when he foresaw that he must
quit the scene, before he could accomplish the work, and must commit that, together with his own reputation, to hands which might be
unequal or unfriendly to the task." 254 Morris also invoked the love of
250
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(1989) (book review). See also Treanor, Takings Clause, supra note 5, at 823-24.
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fame as he urged the convention to permit presidential re-election,
and his argument was more dramatic than Hamilton's. By denying
the President the continued opportunity for fame, the term limitation
would "give a dangerous turn to one of the strongest passions in the
human breast.... Shut the Civil road to Glory & he [the President]
255
may be compelled to seek it by the sword."
Similarly, the open-ended texture of the Constitution may reflect,
in part, the Founders' view of the desire for fame and its perils. Antifederalists criticized the Constitution for not being specific enough
and for not putting adequately precise limits on federal governmental
powers; they were comfortable with the idea that if a Constitution of
the type they proposed was enacted, it would soon need to be replaced. 256 The Framers, in contrast, celebrated the timelessness of
their creation. "Constitutions of civil Government," Hamilton declared, "are not to be framed upon a calculation of existing exigencies; but upon a combination of these, with the probable exigencies of
ages." 257 Such assertions, however, raise the question of why the
Framers thought it so important that the system they were building
last forever. Professor Paul Rahe suggests an answer:
In order that "no manner of Food might be left unto ambition,"
most of [the Founders] even tried what George Washington, like
Harrington's Lord Archon, actually accomplished: to contrive affairs so that "the minds of men were firme in the opinion, that he
could be no seeker of himselfe, in the way of earthly Pompe and
258

Glory."

Thus, the Framers' conception of fame makes their desire for constitutional flexibility understandable. As creators of a nation, the Founders knew how powerful and how dangerous the lust for fame could
be; they sought to enact a constitution flexible enough to prevent
tempting future generations of fame-seekers to overturn the polity.
On a less grand level, the Opinions Clause-empowering the
President to "require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer
in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to
the Duties of their respective Offices" 259-sought to harness individual concern for fame. James Iredell wrote that the Clause would lead
2 Farrand, supranote 27, at 53.
See LIENESCH, supra note 224, at 145-50.
257 THE FEDERALIST No. 34, at 210 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
See also Treanor & Sperling, supranote 5, at 1942-43 (discussing Framers' conscious choice
of an open-ended constitution).
258 RAHE, supranote 224, at 571 (quoting Harrington). See also LIENESCH, supra note
224, at 181 ("Under the new system, Americans were never again to undertake extraordinary political actions, because from that time there were, at least in theory, no more revolutions to be fought and no more constitutions to be founded. Above all, from that time
255
256
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the Cabinet to weigh the courses of action that they recommended
with care: "[A written opinion] must for ever afterwards speak for
itself, and commit the character of the writer, in lasting colors, either
of fame or infamy, or neutral insignificance, to future ages, as well as
the present. '260 Recognition of the importance of the desire for fame
also lies behind Adams's attempt to create titles for the holders of
national office. For example, he proposed to the Senate that the President be referred to as "His most benign highness." 2 61 Although Adams's effort met with abuse-it was suggested that Adams be styled
"His Rotundity"-it was consistent with his belief that, unless the desire for distinction was used to attract people to the public life, they

2 62
would wholly abandon it for the private realm.

Finally, the Founders' conception of the desire for fame also provides an explanation for the constitutional provisions concerning the
military. As the Founders reflected on fame and its significance for
constitutional government, the desire for military glory became a particular focus of concern. The Revolution had made only one individual a world figure: the nation's military leader, George
Washington. 263 And Washington had devoutly sought that fame.
Richard Brookhiser has recently written that Washington "hoped his
reputation would be honored in later years by the country he had
made and celebrated by its poets." 264 His contemporaries acknowledged his preeminent fame, although not all thought itjust. Writing
about the fact that Washington was treated as the greatest leader of
the Revolutionary War, Adams sarcastically observed to Benjamin
Rush that "mankind bow down with [the most] reverence" to "bloody
battles and splendid victories.1265 "The French and American Revolutions differed from each other in many things," Rush wrote Adams,
"but they were alike in one particular-the former gave all its power to
a single man, the latter all its fame." 266 While Rush and Adams deplored this state of affairs, Jefferson celebrated it. In his Notes on the
State of Virginia,Jefferson argued for America's capacity to produce
great individuals and listed Washington first: "In war we have pro260

James Iredell, Answers to Mr. Mason's Objections to the New Constitution, in PAMPHLETS

ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 140, at 335, 348. See also Akhil
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duced a Washington, whose memory will be adored while liberty shall
have votaries, whose name will triumph over time, and will in future
ages assume its just station among the most celebrated worthies of the
world .... *267
Although the Founders disagreed about whether Washington deserved preeminence, all believed that he was remarkable for having
been in a position to pursue greater fame and power and for not yielding to the temptation. As George Mason declared, "So disinterested
and amiable a character as General Washington might never command again." 268 Patrick Henry, as well, stressed the nation's rare fortune in having found such a man:
In great dangers [dictatorial] power has been given.-Rome had
furnished us with an illustrious example.-America found a person
worthy of that trust: She looked to Virginia for him. We gave a
dictatorial power to hands that used it gloriously; and which were
rendered more glorious by surrendering it up. Where is there a
breed of such Dictators? Shall we find a set of American Presidents
of such a breed? Will the American President come and lay prostrate at the feet of Congress his laurels? I fear there are few men
269
who can be trusted on that head.

Few would have Washington's ability to forsake the opportunity
to gather the laurels of war. Indeed, the memorial given at Washington's death suggests that the Senate feared that even he might have
been tempted to overreach:
With patriotic pride, we review the life of our WASHINGTON, and
compare him with those of other countries, who have been pre-eminent in fame. Ancient and modern names are diminished before
him. Greatness and guilt have too often been allied; but his fame is
whiter than it is brilliant.... The scene is closed, and we are no
longer anxious lest misfortune should sully his glory .... Favored of
heaven, he departed without exhibiting the weakness of
2 70
humanity.
Given the Founders' conception of the lure of military fame, the
President was a logical choice to head the military because his desire
for fame would motivate him to win any wars that the nation waged. At
the same time, as the next Part will argue, this same desire for military
glory meant that the President could not be trusted to decide when to
start war.
267 ThomasJefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, in THOMASJEFFERSON: WRITINGs 123,
190 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984).
268 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1378
(John P. Kaminski &GaspareJ. Saladino eds., 1976) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY].
269 9 id. at 1058.
270 ANNALS OF CONG., 6th Cong. 17 (Dec. 1799).

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:695

III
FAME AND THE WAR POWERS CLAUSE

As previously discussed, at the time the Constitution was drafted
and ratified, there was little discussion about what the War Powers
Clause meant. But analysis of the ratification debates about war, fame,
and the Executive reveal a fear of Executive desire to lead the nation
into war in order to achieve personal glory. These statements thus
provide the missing link in the argument made by pro-Congress scholars; they suggest the motivation for giving Congress alone the power
to start war. After surveying evidence from the ratification debates,
this Part turns to a discussion of the new nation's first foreign policy
crisis-the Neutrality Crisis of 1793-and focuses on Madison's
Helvidius letters. In these letters, Madison made explicit the previously implicit link between concerns about the dangers of the desire
for fame and the decision to vest the war power in Congress. The Part
will then turn to John Adams's analysis of Alexander Hamilton's role
in the Quasi-War of 1798-1800 and the Federalist attacks on the War
of 1812 as further examples of the early view that an individual's desire for glory could lead him to push the nation into battle.
A.

Constitutional Debates

As supporters and opponents of the Constitution debated the resolution of military questions, they revealed a common belief that
kings and other individuals with the power to lead their nation into
war were likely to do so in order to gain personal glory. In other
words, Adams's observation that "the man of spirit and ambition...
looks forward with satisfaction to the prospect of foreign war ... in
which he may draw upon himself the attention and admiration of
mankind" operated with particular force when the person in question
was a leader who would reap the lion's share of fame from victory.2 71
In FederalistNo. 4, John Jay argued that a united country was necessary, among other reasons, to protect against unjust wars initiated by
European powers. In explaining why European nations were prone to
initiate such conflicts, he wrote:
[A] bsolute monarchs will often make war when their nations are to
get nothing by it, but for purposes and objects merely personal,
such as, a thirst for military glory .... These and a variety of motives, which affect only the mind of the Sovereign, often lead him to
engage in wars not sanctified byjustice, or the voice and interests of
2 72
his people.
271
272
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Thus, the "absolute monarch[ ] ...thirst[ing] for military glory," will
start wars that "the voice ... of his people" would counsel against

starting. In defending the federal taxing power, Hamilton in Federalist
No. 34 relied on similar assumptions. He contended that the new nation's military needs would be modest, and contrasted them with
Great Britain's. "[T]he expences incurred in the prosecution of the
ambitious enterprizes and vain-glorious pursuits of a Monarchy, are
not a proper standard by which to judge of those which might be necessary in a republic ....

27
,,
3 Paralleling Jay, Hamilton took the posi-

tion that the "ambiti[on]" and "vain-glor[y]" of the monarch would
cause him to begin wars that would not have been begun by a republic. 2 74 Significantly, although ambition today is most commonly the

love of power or wealth, its most common usage in the late eighteenth
century was, "[I he desire of preferment or honour." 275
A Federalist writing under the pen name "Foreign Spectator" also
suggested that the desire for military glory caused leaders to make
war:
[M]ilitary honor.., is indeed very dazzling ....Yet this honor is
not sufficient for republics, because it regards war rather as a theatre of glory, than a trial of patriotic virtue, and values a Caesar
[who] ...to astonish the world by his talents, became its conqueror,

76
and the master of his own country.2
It is, then, the desire for glory, to "astonish the world by his talents,"
that motivates a Caesar to conquer. To offer one final Federalist example, in the Virginia ratifying convention, Federalist leader George
Nicholas favorably compared the Constitution, which gave Congress
the power to call out the militia, with the English system, in which the
monarch held that power. "[The] Prince['s decision would be] governed by... ambition, or mere motives of personal interest," while
2 77
Congress "will be actuated by motives of fellow-feeling."
The Antifederalists, in fact, shared the Federalists' belief that an
individual, entrusted with control over the military, would use it to
gain glory. Patrick Henry proclaimed:
A republic has this advantage over a monarchy, that its wars are generally founded on more just grounds. A republic can never enter
into a war, unless it be a national war-unless it be approved of, or

desired by the whole community....

I call also for an example,

when a republic has been engaged in a war contrary to the wishes of
its people. There are thousands of examples, where the ambition of
273
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its Prince [has] precipitated a nation into the most destructive
27 8

war.

Henry's concern was not simply the narrow one that kings should not
be given the power to lead a nation to war, but the broader one that
any one individual-king or not-entrusted with the power to start
war would use it to achieve personal glory. Thus, commenting on recent Dutch history, he stated: "The glorious republic of Holland has
erected monuments of her warlike intrepidity and valor: Yet she is
now totally ruined by a Stadtholder-a Dutch President. The destructive wars into which that nation has been plunged, has since involved
her in ambition." 279 An Antifederalist writing as "American Citizen"
took a similar view: "There is a wide difference between the troops of
such a commonwealth as ours, founded on equal and unalterableprinciples, and those of a regal government, where ambition and oppression
'280
are the profession of the king.
Antifederalist Melancton Smith contrasted the American situation with the European situation: "The European governments are
almost all of them framed, and administered with a view to arms, and
war, as that in which their chief glory consists .... ,"281 According to
Smith, personal reasons motivated the monarchs of Europe to declare
war. He wrote, "Let the monarchs in Europe, share among them the
glory of depopulating countries .... I envy them not the honor, and I
pray heaven this country may never be ambitious of it."282 Smith contrasted the illusory glory which European monarchs pursued with the
real glory of substantial achievement: "The czar Peter the great, acquired great glory by his arms; but all this was nothing, compared with
the true glory which he obtained, by civilizing his rude and barbarous
subjects, difffusing among them knowledge, and establishing, and cultivating the arts of life .... ,,283
The various examples of ambition and glory-seeking cited above
do not directly involve Congress or a democratically-selected President. But neither Antifederalists nor Federalists thought that Americans were immune from the fame-seeking and glory-seeking that
affected Europeans. I have previously discussed the Federalist belief
that a proper constitution needed to account for the desire for fame.
Antifederalists were at least as vociferous on this point, with the significant difference being that while the Federalists believed that the Con278
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stitution controlled glory-seeking, the Antifederalists did not. An
Antifederalist writing as "Denatus" observed:
[F] or purposes best known to this almighty sovereign of pure goodness and order, we are subject to many jarring propensities. Among
these, vanity, ambition, and the love of riches are not the least. While reason and conscience can confine the passions, their action
and re-action on each other, constitute human happiness. But,
when they overcome reason and conscience, they produce our misery. To guard against this misfortune, as much as human foresight
could discover, ought to have been the chief business of the late
284
foederal [sic] convention.
In arguing against a standing army, Melancton Smith asked: "Are we
so much better than the people of other ages and of other countries,
that the same allurements of power and greatness, which led them
aside from their duty, will have no influence upon men in our country?" 285 The answer was obvious: "[T] he passion for pomp, power and

greatness, works as powerfully in the hearts of many of our better sort,
2 86
as it ever did in any country under heaven."
Antifederalist "Candidus" made a similar argument against entrusting the national government with the war power. As he did, he
strikingly described the rarity of selfless leaders who refused to misuse
their power:
To trust this [war] power in the hands of a few men delegated for
two, four and six years, is complimenting the ambition of human
nature too highly, to risque the tranquility of these States on their
absolute determination. Certain characters now on the stage, we have
reason to venerate, but though this country is now blessed with a
Washington, Frnaklin [sic], Hancock and Adams, yet posterity may
have reason to rue the day when their political welfare depends on
the decision of men who may fill the places of these worthies.2 8 7
As historian Forrest McDonald has explained, "[I] t was a clich6
that in public affairs the ruling passions of most men were avarice and
ambition, the love of money and the love of power or popular applause."28 8 Governmental actors were all prone to ambition. But it
was the individual who acted alone-who had special power, responsibility, and visibility-who was most likely to pursue fame because he
had the greatest opportunity to achieve it. The legislator did not fall
into this category. As Madison wrote in FederalistNo. 10, "moral ...
motives"-among which Madison considered concerns about reputa284
285
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tion 2 8 9 -"lose their efficacy in proportion to the number combined
together."290 But the President, as a lone actor, was likely to be driven
by fame. Significantly, when Hamilton and Morris spoke about the
love of fame and what it meant for the American constitutional sys29 1
tem, their sole focus was on how it would affect presidentialaction.
In discussing the desire to be known and remembered and the
consequences of that desire, Adams put the point more broadly: "In
proportion as men rise higher in the world, whether by election, descent, or appointment, and are exposed to the observation of greater
numbers of people, the effects of their own passions and of the affections of others for them become more serious, interesting, and dangerous."2 92 It is not the mode by which the individual comes to lead a
nation that matters-whether, for example, he is an hereditary king
or an elected president-it is the simple fact that he leads a nation
293
that makes his passions "serious, interesting and dangerous."
In FederalistNo. 6, Hamilton made a related point in discussing
the origins of war. Some wars, he wrote:
take their origin intirely in private passions; in the attachments, enmities, interests, hopes and fears of leading individuals in the communities of which they are members. Men of this class, whether the
favourites of a king or of a people, have in too many instances
abused the confidence they possessed; and assuming the pretext of
some public motive, have not scrupled to sacrifice the national
tran294
quility to personal advantage, or personal gratification.
Hamilton offered Pericles as his example of a popular favorite who
had embroiled his nation in conflict for reasons stemming from "private passions," the consequence of which was "the ruin of the Athenian commonwealth."2 95 In short, the "leading individuals in the
communit[y]" are likely to use their power to lead their nation into
war for personal reasons.2 96 This is true regardless of whether they
derive their power from being "the favourites of a king or of a people."29 7 Either way, the consequences are disastrous.
289
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Combined, these statements about fame and war strongly suggest
why the Framers gave Congress the power to declare war. First, these
statements are evidence of a widely-held belief among Federalists and
Antifederalists that kings-the "executive" that they knew-had frequently led their nations into war solely to achieve glory. Second, they
reveal a widespread conviction that the passions that influenced leaders of a monarchy would also hold sway over leaders of a republic.
Third, the statements reflect an understanding that the President, the
head of the new executive branch, was the governmental official most
likely to pursue fame. These statements lead to the logical, if unexpressed, conclusion that the President could not be trusted with the
power to declare war because, in order to achieve glory, he would lead
the nation into war when it was not in the national interest.
Admittedly, this sentiment was not directly expressed in Philadelphia or during the ratification debates. However, there was also little
discussion of any kind concerning why the power to declare war was
given to Congress. 298 Moreover, in the course of the first prominent
post-ratification debate about the War Powers Clause, James Madison
clearly stated that the President's inclination to war because of his desire for fame justified the Framers' grant of the power to declare war
9
to Congress.29
B.

The Helvidius Letters

In April 1793, President Washington proclaimed American neutrality in the war between France and Britain.3 00 Hamilton, then Secretary of the Treasury, defended both the wisdom of Washington's
decision and his constitutional power to issue the proclamation in a
series of letters written under the pen name "Pacificus." 30 Hamilton
grounded his constitutional claims in the contention that foreign policy was an Executive function and that congressional powers under
the Constitution in the foreign policy area were therefore "to be construed strictly-and ought to be extended no further than is essential
to their execution." 302 He acknowledged that Executive actions could
"affect the ... exercise of the Power of the Legislature to declare war,"
but argued that this did not prevent the President from exercising
powers granted him under the Constitution.3 0 3 According to Hamil298
300
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creton, "[T] he division of the Executive Power [in the Constitution
304
ates] ...

a concurrentauthority, in the distributed cases."

Madison was troubled by Washington's proclamation. A letter
that he wrote Jefferson onJune 13, 1793 indicates that he viewed Congress as having the sole power to initiate war, and that he thought the
Neutrality Proclamation represented an indirect but significant Executive intrusion on congressional power:
The right to decide the question whether the duty & interest of the
U.S. require war or peace under any circumstances, and whether
their disposition be towards the one or the other seems to be essentially & exclusively involved in the right vested in the Legislature, of
P. & S. [President and
declaring war in time of peace; and in the
30 5
Senate] of making peace in time of war.
As Hamilton's Pacificus Letters appeared in print,Jefferson forwarded
them to Madison and urged him to write a response: "[T] ake up your
pen, select the most striking heresies, and cut him to peices [sic] in
the face of the public. There is nobody else who can & will enter the
30 6
lists with him."
Complying with Jefferson's request, Madison wrote five letters
under the nom de plume "Helvidius. '3 0 7 Madison's focus was on Hamilton's constitutional argument, rather than on the substantive merit of
the proclamation. He attacked the notion of concurrent jurisdiction
and proclaimed the importance "of a rigid adherence to the simple,
the received and the fundamental doctrine of the constitution, that
the power to declare war including the power ofjudging of the causes
of war is fully and exclusively vested in the legislature."3 0 8 Again,
Madison here clearly equates the power to declare war with the power
to initiate conflict.
Although Madison's argument against concurrent jurisdiction
has often been criticized,3 0 9 and Madison himself had limited enthusiId.
Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (June 13, 1793), in 15 MADISON
PAPERS, supra note 35, at 29.
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asm for the project, 3 10 the letters merit close attention, not just because they reflect a pro-Congress understanding of the War Powers
Clause, but because of their discussion of why the Framers gave Congress the power to declare war. As he concluded the fourth Helvidius
letter, having articulated and defended his personal understanding of
the War Powers Clause, Madison sought to strengthen his case by setting forth the concerns which prompted the Framers' decision to assign to Congress the power to declare war:
In no part of the constitution is more wisdom to be found than
in the clause which confides the question of war or peace to the
legislature, and not to the executive department. Beside the objection to such a mixture of heterogeneous powers: the trust and the
temptation would be too great for any one man: not such as nature
may offer as the prodigy of many centuries, but such as may be expected in the ordinary successions of magistracy. War is in fact the
true nurse of executive aggrandizement. In war a physical force is
to be created, and it is the executive will which is to direct it. In war
the public treasures are to be unlocked, and it is the executive hand
which is to dispense them. In war the honors and emoluments of
office are to be multiplied; and it is the executive patronage under
which they are to be enjoyed. It is in war, finally, that laurels are to
be gathered, and it is the executive brow they are to encircle. The
strongest passions, and most dangerous weaknesses of the human
breast; ambition, avarice, vanity, the honorable or venial love of
fame, are all in conspiracy against the desire and duty of peace.
Hence it has grown into an axiom that the executive is the department of power most distinguished by its propensity to war:
hence it is the practice of all states, in proportion as they are free, to
3 11
disarm the propensity of its influence.
Here, in short compass, Madison pulled together the previously unspoken arguments for assigning to Congress the power to declare war.
The power of his passions, Madison contends, makes the individual an
unsuitable repository for the power to declare war. Perhaps "the
prodigy of many centuries" will be able to triumph over these passions, but the ordinary individual-"such as may be expected in the
ordinary successions of magistracy"-will not, because the lures are so
compelling.3 1 2 The President simply has too much to gain by leading
vanced in the Federalist Papers, and that it was not logically coherent, since Madison acknowledged that the Executive could legitimately take some actions that would make war
more likely. See SOFAER, supra note 14, at 114-15. But see BANNING, supra note 301, at 527
n.18 (Helvidius "decimates the logic of Hamilton's argument that the executive possesses
something like a concurrent right with the legislature to determine whether treaty obligations compel war or peace.").
310 See BANNING, supra note 301, at 377.
311
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the nation into war and then leading the nation during war. He increases his power in a very tangible way: he "direct[s]" the "physical
force. . . created."3 13 He increases his control of money: he "dispense[s]" "public treasures. ''1 4 He solidifies his power: the opportunities for "executive patronage" are "multiplied."3 1 What is most
striking is the conclusion to which Madison builds. The culminating
passion is "love of fame."3 16 The President will be inclined toward war
because he will hope to wear the "laurels" of victory.31 7 As a result,
"the executive is the department of power most distinguished by its
3 18
propensity to war."
Implicitly, Madison is also arguing that the legislator will not be
affected by these passions (or at least not powerfully), and that he will
therefore act disinterestedly in deciding whether he favors war. His
passions will not be engaged, in part, because the legislature has only
limited control of the instruments of war, and, in part, because any
benefits from war that flow to the legislature will flow to a group,
rather than to a single individual. Because the legislator does not control army operations or the actual dispersion of funds or the patronage generated by war, he will not seek war in order to increase his
power or the wealth under his direction. The fame of a great triumph
will not go to the legislator who votes in favor of a successful war, for
he is but one of many and the fruits of victory will be diminished by
being shared. Because he is not in control of the military, he will not
be hailed as the conqueror. The laurels will not be his.
The Helvidius letters are critical evidence concerning the meaning of the War Powers Clause and the motives which led the Founders
to give Congress the sole power to initiate war. The letters are roughly
contemporaneous with the founding. They are the work of an individual who played a central role in drafting the War Powers Clause, as
well as a central role-perhaps the central role-in drafting the Constitution as a whole. The fact that they emerge from a political conflict and are partisan documents does not decrease their evidentiary
significance. Madison, a shrewd politician, was clearly trying to make
his case against Hamilton by appealing to broadly held notions about
government and war. In doing so, he laid special stress on the lure of
fame.
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Hamilton and the Quasi-War

Further evidence of the founding generation's belief that an individual's desire for glory could recklessly lead a nation to war comes,
ironically, from the pen of a former President, John Adams who, in
narrating the history of his administration, discussed his refusal to
lead the nation into a full-scale war. In 1809, as tensions between the
United States and Great Britain threatened to end in war, Adams
wrote a series of letters to the Boston Patriot explaining why he had
opposed declaring war against France and had instead worked for
peace during his presidency.3 19
As previously noted, the undeclared naval war with France-the
"Quasi-War"-lasted from 1798-1800 and marked the new nation's
first sustained military conflict with a European power.3 20 It also
marked an exception to the "axiom" that Madison enunciated in the
Helvidius letters. That is, during much of the conflict, Congress took
a more aggressive stance than the President.32 ' Adams took great
pride in this fact, subsequently writing: "I desire no other inscription
on my gravestone than: 'here liesJohn Adams, who took upon himself
the responsibility of the peace with France in the year 1800.' "322
Those unsympathetic to Adams had a ready explanation for why he
was not as aggressive as others and the answer had to do with his inability to obtain glory from a war. Noting that "no part of [the Government] was more averse to war than the Executive," Congressman
Rutledge opined: "[Adams] is no warrior, and, consequently, war has
no laurels in store for him."3 2 3 A very similar explanation for Adams's
moderate behavior came from a far more sympathetic quarter, his
wife. Abigail Adams wrote her friend Mary Cranch: "What benefit
can war be to him? He has no ambition for military Glory. '3 24
The champion of the forces pushing for an aggressive stance
against France was Hamilton. 325 He sought not only the creation of a
revitalized army, but he also engineered a campaign to be designated
its Commander in Chief.3 26 When Secretary of State Timothy Pickering proposed naming Hamilton, Adams immediately dismissed the
possibility of awarding the position to his antagonist. To crush the
319
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Hamilton boomlet, Adams sent Washington a letter requesting that he
serve as Commander in Chief, and then precipitously forwarded
Washington's name to the Senate as his nominee for the post without
waiting for the former President's reply.3 27 Adams's haste angered
Washington.3 28 Hamilton, now aware that he would not be Commander in Chief, convinced the offended former President to accept
the post and then to name him as his second in command.3 29 Adams
balked, insisting that former Secretary of War Henry Knox serve as
Washington's deputy.33 0 Washington informed the President that he
would resign his commission if Hamilton were not awarded the position.3 3 1 A bitter Adams complied with Washington's demand, afterwards writing that he had been forced to name "the most restless,
impatient, artful, indefatigable and unprincipled intriguer in the
United States, if not the world, to be second in command."3 32 Perhaps not coincidentally, at approximately this time, Adams's enthusiasm for war with France began to diminish.3 3 3
As he recounted the events of the "Quasi-War" a decade later,
Adams made clear that Hamilton had been the principal force behind
the movement for war. "[S] uch was the influence of Mr. Hamilton in
Congress, that, without any recommendation from the President, they
passed a bill to raise an army, not a large one, indeed, but enough to
overturn the then Federal government."3- 4 And just as Congressman
Rutledge had contended that Adams was reluctant to go to war because he was unlikely to win fame, Adams suggested that behind Hamilton's push for war was his desire for personal glory. "The army of
fifty thousand men," Adams wrote, "appeared to me to be one of the
wildest extravagances of a knight-errant."33 5 At another point, Adams
observed that Hamilton schemed of "ensuring a war with France, and
enabling him to mount his hobby-horse, the command of an army of
fifty thousand, ten thousand of them to be horse[s]."3 3 6 Peace was
"[p]ernicious ... to his [Hamilton's] views of ambition and domination. It extinguished his hopes of being at the head of a victorious
army of fifty thousand men, without which, he used to say, he had no
idea of having a head upon his shoulders for four years longer. '3 37
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According to Adams, "Hamilton hoped [for] . . . an irreconcilable
breach and a declaration of war. He was disappointed, and lost the
command of his army."33 8 In a personal letter written shortly before
his public letters to the Boston Patriot,Adams drew together many of
these themes in a sentence, stating: "'Hamilton's hobby horse was
troops! troops! ...With all of the vanity and timidity of Cicero, all the
Caedebauchery of Marc Anthony [sic] and all the ambition of Julius
3 39
sar,... his object was the command of fifty thousand men.'
As his personal letter suggests, Adams's public denunciation of
Hamilton was consistent with his private thoughts about the man, and
the public attack was, indeed, more temperate than many of Adams's
private observations. For example, Adams wrote in a letter to Benjamin Rush that Hamilton was "a bastard brat of a Scotch pedlar," and
a "creature... in a delirium of ambition... [who] hated every man,
young or old, who stood in his way or could in any manner eclipse his
laurels or rival his pretensions."m Agreeing with Adams's assessment
that Hamilton was motivated by a desire for "laurels," some historians
have concluded that in urging war with France, Hamilton was "un'3 41
doubtedly motivated by his ambition and quest for military fame."
Even some of Hamilton's friends thought this the case. For example,
one wrote him that during the Revolutionary War, Hamilton had "devoted his talents to enhanc[ing] another's glory," and suggested that
it was now his turn to obtain such glory.342 Indeed, earlier in his life
Hamilton himself had voiced his longing for war. The first surviving
letter we have of Hamilton's is a letter that he wrote as a teen-age clerk
in a St. Croix counting house to Edward Stevens, his childhood
friend.3 43 Stevens had departed the island to attend King's College in
NewYork City. 344 Left behind, Hamilton sadly wrote, "Ned, my Ambition is prevalent that I contemn the grov'ling and condition of a Clerk
or the like, to which my Fortune &c. condemns me and would willingly risk my life tho' not my Character to exalt my Station."3 45 He
closed, "My Folly makes me ashamd and beg youll Conceal it, yet
Id. at 280.
339 DECONDE, supra note 185, at 112 (quoting letter from Adams to Adrian Van der
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Neddy we have seen such Schemes successfull when the Projector is
3 46
Constant I shall Conclude saying I wish there was a War."
Therefore, when in Adams's letters to the Boston Patriothe described Hamilton's campaign against France as "one of the wildest extravagances of a knight-errant," and said that the would-be
Commander-in-Chief sought to use the army as his "hobby-horse," he
was simply giving public expression to his private beliefs.3 47 He may
even have been correct, at least in part, that Hamilton sought to provoke a war in order to gain personal glory. But the critical point to be
made here does not concern whether Adams was right or wrong about
Hamilton. It is, rather, that the world that the Framers inhabited was
one in which it was possible for a national leader of the first rank to
believe honestly and to state publicly-not in the heat of the moment,
but in a considered way after a decade of reflection-that another
national leader of the first rank sought to precipitate a war simply in
order to achieve personal glory by leading the nation's troops in
combat.
Adams's statements do not directly concern the War Powers
Clause. The individual whom he saw pushing for war was not the President, and the branch of government over which that individual exerted power was legislative, not executive. But, in a larger way, these
statements bear directly on our understanding of how the Clause
came to take the form it did. Like the Helvidius letters, Adams's letters reflect the view that an individual who is in a position to gain
military glory will be tempted to do so by pushing the nation to war,
regardless of whether or not war is in the national interest. Adams's
letters thus provide further evidence that members of the framing
generation believed that, even in a republic, the desire for glory was so
profound that the individual who controlled the military could not be
trusted with the decision whether to go to war. Of course, both Adams and Madison believed that some could resist that temptation.
Madison believed that "the prodigy of many centuries" would be able
to master his passions. 3 48 And, Adams had faith in Adams. But the
necessity of a rule framed to govern the ordinary case was clear. Alternatively, to view the matter from Congressman Rutledge's cynical perspective, the nation could not count on always having a president who,
being "no warrior," would avoid war out of the fear that it had "no
349
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D. The War of 1812
Ironically, it was Madison-the individual who had cautioned
that Presidents' love of fame would lead them to favor war-who
served as President during the nation's first declared war, the War of
1812. When it was over, his supporters applauded him for not having
sacrificed the good of the nation to the pursuit of glory. For example,
the day he left office, a committee of Washington, D.C. citizens paid
tribute to him, stating: "Power and national glory, Sir, have often
before, been acquired by the sword; but rarely without the sacrifice of
civil or political liberty."3 5 0 They lauded his "vigilance" in "restrain [ing] the sword within its proper limits, ... wield [ing] an armed
force of fifty thousand men, aided by an annual disbursement of many
3 51
millions, without infringing a political, civil, or religious right."
But, during the course of the war, Federalist opponents painted a very
different picture, suggesting that Madison's desire for glory and personal motives had drawn the nation into a disastrous war. Congressman Potter proclaimed Madison "an ambitious military chief'3 5 2 and
suggested that his ambition knew no limits:
[I]f an Administration like the present, without money, without an
army, or navy, would plunge this country so unprepared into a war
. . the next thing they would want colonies, as other nations had
done, and that Bermuda and New Providence would be in our way;
and we must have Jamaica to get good rum and sugar. And instead
of this country enjoying peace, which is above all things the most
desirable, we should be involved like other nations in perpetual
3
war.35
Congressman Miller called the war a "war of conquest" and suggested
that President Madison had started it in the hope of quieting opposition: "[A] weak and wicked administration... finding the confidence
of the people withdrawn, and their power about to pass into other
hands, have nothing to do but to declare war, and instantly all opposition must cease .... ,354 Senator Goldsborough agreed. He observed
that "[t] he President himself is the father and patron of this war," 355
and suggested that the war had been declared to secure support for
the Administration. "Thus," he said, "the tottering edifice is saved
from the tempest of public opinion .
...356 Congressmen Daniel
*
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Webster attacked the war as one begun to obtain "the harvest of greatness and glory." 357 Congressman Law similarly attacked the war as
one fought "for glory,"3 5 8 adding that he could not "consent to involve
the country in carnage, distress and ruin, for that phantom. '3 59 Congressman Brigham invoked the individual who many Americans of the
day would have offered as the principal example of a man whose pursuit of greatness and glory had come at tragic cost: "[T] here is no
right [in Canada] but a Napoleon right, and that right is power, and
°
not that which reason approves." 360
Early in the war, the link between the desire for glory and the
decision to go to war received its fullest exploration in a speech by
Massachusetts Congressmen Josiah Quincy, a leading Federalist and
future President of Harvard University. 36 1 Quincy argued that the motivation for war lay in personal interest, specifically "the personal or
local ambition of the members of the American Cabinet." 62 "Whoever plants the American standard on the walls of Quebec," he stated,
"conquers it for himself, and not for the people of the United
States." 63 He ascribed to President Madison and Secretary of State
James Monroe ambitions that had a monarchical cast:
To secure the succession, and keep it in the destined line, has been,
is, and will continue to be, the main object of the policy of these
men [Madison and his Secretary of State James Monroe]. This is
the point on which the projects of the Cabinet, for the three years
past, have been brought to bear-that James the First [James
Madison] should be made to continue four years longer. And this is
the point on which the projects of the Cabinet will be brought to
bear for the three years to come-that James the Second [James
Monroe] shall be made to succeed, according to the fundamental
3 64
rescripts of the Monticellian dynasty.
The desire to remain in power was joined with a desire for a kind of
glory that Quincy pronounced ignoble, and, like Brigham, he invoked
the example of Napoleon.
What glory [will victory bring]? Is it the glory of the tiger which lifts
his jaws, all foul and bloody, from the bowels of his victim, and roars
for his companions of the wood to come and witness his prowess
and his spoils? Such is the glory of Ginghis Khan, and of Bonaparte.
357
358
359
360

Id. at 942.
ANNALS OF CONG., 12th Cong., 2d Sess. 540 (Jan. 1813).
Id.
Id. at 514. For a discussion of Napoleon, his desire for greatness, and popular

perceptions, see BRAUDY, supra note 224, at 408-16.
361 For a discussion of Congressman Quincy and the prominence of this speech, see
DONALD R. HicKEY, THE WAR OF 1812, at 109 (1989).
362 ANNALS OF CONG., 12th Cong., 2d Sess. 561 (Jan. 1813).

363

Id. at 549.

364

Id. at 564.

THE POWER TO DECLARE WAR

1997]

Be such glory far, very far, from my country. Never, never may it be
3 65
accursed with such fame.
3 66
"A giant obtain[s] glory by crushing a pigmy!" Quincy exclaimed.
"That giant must have a pigmy's spirit who could reap, or hope, glory
from such an achievement."36 7 He called on the nation to pursue instead a different kind of fame:
"Fame is no plant that grows on mortal soil,
Nor in the glistering foil
Set off to the world, nor in broad rumor lies,
But lives and spreads aloft, by those pure eyes,
And perfect witness of alljudgingJove,
As he pronounces lastly on each deed."
3 68
May such fame as this be my country's meed
In January 1814, one year after Quincy's speech, the American
offensive in Canada had proven a failure, and it was the British who
had taken the offensive.3 69 In that month, Congressman Miller gave a
speech that, like Quincy's, highlighted the relationship between war
and the desire for glory, although the warning about the relationship
now came from a different perspective. Miller suggested that Madison
had started the war in order to achieve glory, mistakenly believing that
the Canadians would surrender rather than fight: "The American
commander was to gain his laurels, with 'rapier unstained, and sword
unhacked,' and in honor of his bloodless victory, was to have an 'ovation' decreed him."3 70 This was an enormous miscalculation. The
navy had won victories, but Madison could not properly take credit for
them: "The Administration ought not to rob the individuals con37
cerned of their well-earned laurels."1
' Discussing Commander
Perry's naval triumphs, Miller observed: "[T] here is no glory without
danger-and the fame acquired may be in proportion to the disparity
of force. The Administration, however, is not justified in omitting to
place our naval force on Lake Erie on a more respectable footing
.... ,372 But the Executive could fairly be assigned responsibility for
what the army had done. Miller sarcastically stated: "I deny this Administration any credit on account of the Navy; but I am content they
should be decorated with all the laurels their army has gained. It is
their army; let them monopolize its glory."37 3 After listing a series of
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disasters, Miller highlighted one incident involving the army through
which a kind of fame had been won: 'Your commanding officer
[General McClure] had determined to cross the Niagara, and yet with
cold-blooded insensibility he burnt Newark, 'the loveliest village of the
plain.' If General McClure panted for immortality he has obtained it;
so did the miscreant who fired the temple of Ephesus." 3 74 McClure
was thus the modern Herostratus, the man who had burned the temple of Ephesus; each had destroyed something beautiful to be
remembered forever.3 75 And that was Madison's fame as well, for having led the nation to war. He could "monopolize" the fame of a
Herostratus.
IV
CURRENT SIGNIFICANCE

To this point, this Article has principally been an attempt at recovery-at unearthing a forgotten concern. It has shown that the
Founders and political leaders of the early republic feared that the
lure of fame would lead individuals, in general, and Presidents, in particular, to favor war, even when it was not in the national interest. The
Article has argued that, because of this fear, the Founders gave Congress alone the power to start war. This Part explores the significance
of this concern about fame to modern interpretations of the War Powers Clause, both from originalist and nonoriginalist perspectives.
A.

Traditional Originalist

The greatest weakness of the pro-Congress originalist reading of
the War Powers Clause is that pro-Congress scholars have been unable
to offer an explanation for why the Founders thought that the power
to initiate conflict should be exclusively vested in Congress. Pro-Executive scholars, in contrast, have been able to offer a range of reasons
why the Founders would have likely given this power to the Executive. 376 In particular, precedent and the Founders' views on the
strengths of the President suggest that the Founders would have given
the President the power to start wars. 377 Moreover, the terms used in
the Constitution-declare war, letters of marque and reprisal-were
terms with a fixed and narrow meaning in international law.37 8 As a
result of this evidence, Pro-Executive scholars argue that the warmaking power is vested in the President, despite relevant statements from
Id. at 972.
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the founding generation indicating that Congress alone had the
power to initiate conflict.
By highlighting the Founders' concern with the lure of military
fame, this Article has offered a reason why the Founders would have
taken the power to start war away from the Presideht. Madison's
Helvidius letters make the point explicitly: "[T]he question of war" is
confided to the legislature because "[i] t is in war... that laurels are to
be gathered, and it is the executive brow they are to encircle. '3 79 The
Helvidius letters thus clarify both that Madison understood Congress
alone as having the power to start war, and that, because of his concern with fame, he thought this allocation of power appropriate.
Moreover, additional evidence offered in the previous section indicates that the concern about the lure of military fame was widely
shared. Given such concern, the Founders would have wanted to give
Congress alone the power to start war. Thus, this Article has served to
remedy the principal weakness in the pro-Congress argument. It dramatically strengthens the position that the War Powers Clause-in giving Congress the power to declare war and issue letters of marque and
reprisal-was not intended to be read by reference to the usages of
international law. Rather, what the Founders intended was to give
Congress the power to decide in all instances, except those of sudden
attacks, whether the United States should go to war.
The evidence presented above also suggests that the dominant
original understanding was that the President could not veto declarations of war. Scholars have previously argued on textual grounds that
the President lacks the veto power, but no one has made that argument on originalist grounds.38 0 The failure to do so is understandable
because the conceptions of the War Powers Clause previously advanced by both pro-Executive and pro-Congress scholars indicate that
the Founders would have wanted to give the President a veto.
Whether the original understanding was that the President should be
at the center of decisions on war and peace-as pro-Executive scholars maintain-or that as many barriers as possible to war should be
imposed-as pro-Congress scholars maintain-presumably both ends
are advanced by giving the President a veto. 38 ' But if the President's
desire for military fame will consistently push him towards war, then a
veto is pointless because it will not be exercised. Moreover, because
the President's decisionmaking in this area will be hopelessly corrupted by self-interest, it is reasonable to wholly exclude him from the
warmaking process. There is, then, a simple reason why the Founders
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consistently described the decision to declare war as exclusively a legislative decision: they understood it to be an exclusively legislative decision.
For the traditional originalist, then, the inquiry about the meaning of the War Powers Clause is at an end. Traditional originalists
believe thatjudges should construe constitutional text as it was understood at the time of its adoption. The leading champion of this approach-although he has forsaken it in the war powers area-is
Robert Bork, and he has described it in the following fashion: "What
is the meaning of a rule that judges should not change?; It is the
meaning understood at the time of the law's enactment."3 8 2 But there
is another school of originalism, the translation school. The translator seeks to identify the ends that the Constitution's Framers sought to
advance, and then interprets the Constitution in the way that best advances those ends in today's.world, while altering the original reading
as little as possible. 383 Having established the concrete understanding
of the founding generation, the translator must still answer a threshold question: Has the world changed in such a way so that the concrete understanding of the constitutional text should change? 38 4 In
other words, the Founders gave Congress, rather than the Executive,
the power to decide whether to start wars because they wanted the
warmaking decision to be disinterested, and they feared that Presidents would lead the nation into war in order to achieve a place in
history. The translator must answer whether it continues to be true
that the Executive is the branch of government most likely to have
self-interested reasons to wage war.
There are, of course, nonoriginalist approaches to constitutional
law, although it is rare for constitutional scholars to ignore history
wholly. 38 5 In the war powers area, the writings that have accorded the
least weight to the original understanding have been, as previously
noted, the work of pro-Executive scholars, and the focus of this scholarship has been on evolving constitutional structure and pragmatic
concerns. Scholars such as Bork, Rostow, and W. Michael Reisman
382
ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 144 (1990).
383 The translation model has been developed by Professor Lawrence Lessig. See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation,71 Tzx. L. RE,. 1165 (1993); Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v Lopez, 1995 Sup. CT. Rav. 125; Lawrence Lessig,

UnderstandingChanged Readings: Fidelity and Tlheoy, 47 STAN. L. REv. 395 (1995). For an
application of Lessig's model, see Treanor, Takings Clause supra note 5, at 855-87.
384 See Lessig, Fidelity in Translation,supra note 383, at 1263; Treanor, Takings Clause,
supranote 5, at 856-57.
385 Ronald Dworkin, for example, is the paradigmatic example of a constitutional philosopher who advances a moral reading of the document, but nonetheless draws on history
and tradition as guides to constitutional decisionmaking through his concept of "fit." See
RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION
3-18 (1996); RONALD DWORKIN, LAW's EMPIRE 227-28 (1986). For further discussion of the

role of history in constitutional interpretation, even among nonoriginalists, see Flaherty,
supra note 31, at 1745-47.
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have argued that because the President can move more rapidly, forcefully, and secretly than Congress, he should have the power to start
war.3 86 If the thesis of this Article is to have any significance for the
nonoriginalist, it must be shown, not that the Framers feared that the
President would lead the nation into war in order to achieve fame, but
that such concern is a pressing one today.
In short, although their constitutional theories are different, both
the translator and the nonoriginalist are concerned with the relationship between the Founders' insights and modem circumstance. This
topic is the subject of the next section.
B.

Fame, the Presidency, and War

Unlike the Founders, we no longer tend to perceive the desire to
be remembered by history as a fundamental human drive. Writing in
1840, Tocqueville precisely captured the decline in the interest in
fame in its traditional sense and offered a cogent explanation for that
decline. He observed that one of the
first thing[s] that strikes a traveler in the United States is... the
rarity of lofty ambition to be observed in the midst of the universally
ambitious stir of society. No Americans are devoid of a yearning
desire to rise, but hardly any appear to entertain hopes of great
8 87
magnitude or to pursue very lofty aims.
Tocqueville noted that this was a relatively recent phenomenon and
that Americans of the revolutionary era had harbored such ambitions:
All revolutions enlarge the ambition of men. ... When the former barriers that kept back the multitude from fame and power are
suddenly thrown down, a violent and universal movement takes
place towards that eminence so long coveted and at length to be
enjoyed....
Ambition is therefore always extremely great as long as a democratic revolution lasts, and it will remain so for some time after the
88
revolution is consummated.
According to Tocqueville, the establishment of a constitutional and
social order had led people to lower their goals:
A democratic nation, arrived at this permanent and regular
state of things, will present a very different spectacle from that
which I have just described, and we may readily conclude that if
ambition becomes great while the conditions of society are growing
equal, it loses that quality when they have grown so.

386

See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
2 ALExIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY INAMERICA 243 (Phillips Bradley ed., Alfred
A. Knopf 1945) (1840).
388
Md.
at 243-44.
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I believe that ambitious men in democracies are less engrossed
than any others with the interests and the judgment of posterity; the
present moment alone engages and absorbs them. They are more
apt to complete a number of undertakings with rapidity than to
and they care much
raise lasting monuments of their achievements,
3 89
more for success than for fame.
In accordance with Tocqueville's insight, soon after the founding
many Americans came to believe that "there was no more fame to be
won."' 9 0 The young John Quincy Adams, for example, declared:
"The field is extensive; it is fruitful... but the copious treasures of its
fragrance have already been gathered by the hands of genius; and
there now remains for the gleaning of mental indigence, nought but
the thinly scattered sweets which have escaped the vigilance of their
industry."3 9 1 The passing of the Founders' world can be marked, in
part, by a linguistic change that may explain why their concerns about
fame have been obscured. When the Founders spoke of fame, they
meant a desire to leave a mark on history for having done great
39 2
things; for us, to be famous is simply to be widely-known.
This might suggest that the Framers' fear that a President's desire
for fame or glory would lead him to initiate wars was a time-bound
one. The argument against the original understanding would thus be
that, despite grounds for fearing that a President's desire for glory
would make him favor war in 1789 or in 1812, we no longer live in a
society where individuals are obsessed with their place in history. Accordingly, the Framers' distrust of a President with the power to start
war no longer has any relevance, and, to the extent that constitutional
law can move beyond a rigid application of the original understanding, it should do so in this case. Moreover, we need not fear that
Presidents will lead the nation into war in order to achieve fame as we
now understand the word; Presidents are already as "famous" as they
can be.
However, the fact that our societal norms and concerns have
changed does not necessarily mean that Presidents will behave differently than the Founders predicted. Systematic analysis of the continuing accuracy of the Framers' view is beyond the scope of this Article.
There is, however, good evidence that, despite cultural changes, they
were right about the way in which a desire for a place in history would
affect the occupants of the Executive office.

389
390
391

392

Id. at 244-47.
LIENESCH, supra note 224, at 181.
Id. (quotingJohn Quincy Adams, An Oration Pronounced July 4, 1793).
See ADAIR, supra note 32, at 8-13.
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In describing his life's goals, Woodrow Wilson wrote that he had
Ica longing to do immortal work."3 93 He has not been alone in his
desire for immortality. A concern with how they would be
remembered has driven many Presidents. It is significant that Adair
offers one example of a modem American who had a passion for fame
in the eighteenth century sense. Urging a revival of the largely lost
tradition, Adair concluded his essay:
Who can doubt that this obsessive concern with the judgment of
posterity was not one of the ingredients that made the late John
Kennedy something more than just another Irish politician from
Boston. Who can doubt that it was his concern with his fame-his
concern with the judgment of posterity-that made him respond, as
Arthur Schlesinger has told us, to those lovely lines of Stephen
Spender's poem:
I think continually of those who are truly great...
The names of those who in their lives fought for life,
Who wore at their hearts the fire's center.
Born of the sun they travelled a short while towards the
sun,
394
And left the vivid air signed with their honor.
One need not agree with Adair's view that Kennedy "respond[ed] to
Spender's poem" to accept the underlying point that Kennedy was
obsessed with history's judgment. Richard Reeves's recent biography
of Kennedy provides further evidence of this concern:
There was no question in Kennedy's mind, and little argument
from anyone else, that the struggle with communism would be the
focus of the history of his times. As 1961 ended, he had begun an
address to historians meeting in Washington by quoting Churchill's
prediction that history would be kind to his role in World War II:
"Because I intend to write it!"
And Kennedy intended to do the same, with the help of Sorensen and Schlesinger. He had invited one of the historians, David
Donald of Princeton, an expert on Abraham Lincoln, to the White
House and asked him: "How do you go down in the history books
as a great presiden?" 3 95
393

JOHN MORTON BLUM, WOODROW WILSON AND THE POLITICS OF MORALITY 19 (1956)

(quoting Wilson).
394 ADAIR, supra note

32, at 26.

278 (1993). Professor
Donald, in recounting this meeting with Kennedy in the preface of his Lincoln biography,
highlighted President Kennedy's concern about being regarded badly by historians:
He [Kennedy] voiced his dissatisfaction with the glib way the historians had
rated some of his predecessors as "Below Average" and marked a few as
"Failures." Thinking, no doubt, of how his own administration would look
in the backward glance of history, he resented the whole process. With real
feeling he said, "No one has a right to grade a President-not even poor
James Buchanan-who has not sat in his chair, examined the mail and in395
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Ironically, at almost the exact time that Tocqueville was writing,
one American who would later make his mark on history gave evidence that, despite the age in which he lived, he had dreams of the
greatest glory. In 1838, Abraham Lincoln, a young state legislator,
gave a speech to the Young Men's Lyceum of Springfield, Illinois. He
saluted the Founders and the fame they had won. According to Lincoln, the Founders had desired to prove
the capability of a people to govern themselves. If they succeeded,
they were to be immortalized; their names were to be transferred to
counties and cities, and rivers and mountains; and to be revered
and sung, and toasted through all time. If they failed, they were to
be called knaves and fools, and fanatics for a fleeting hour; then to
sink and be forgotten. They succeeded. The experiment is successful; and thousands have won their deathless names in making it
SO.

3 96

Echoing Adams, Lincoln wrote that it seemed that "[t]his field of
glory is harvested, and the crop is already appropriated."3 97 But, unlike Adams, he did not accept the view that glory was no longer attainable: "[N] ew reapers will arise, and they, too, will seek a field."39 8 He
continued:
Towering genius disdains a beaten path. It seeks regions hitherto
unexplored. It sees no distinction in adding story to story, upon the
monuments of fame, erected to the memory of others. It denies
that it is glory enough to serve under any chief. It scorns to tread in
the footsteps of any predecessor, however illustrious. It thirsts and
bums for distinction; and, if possible, it will have it, whether at the
99
expense of emancipating slaves, or enslaving freemen.3

formation that came across his desk, and learned why he made his
decisions."
DAVID HERBERT DONALD, LINCOLN 13 (1995).

396 Abraham Lincoln, Address before the Young Men's Lyceum of Springfield, Illinois
(Jan. 27, 1838), in 1 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 108, 113 (Roy P. Basler
ed., 1953) (emphasis omitted).
397
398

Id.
Id. (emphasis omitted).

399 Id. at 114 (emphasis omitted). This speech has inspired extensive scholarly commentary since Edmund Wilson first focused attention on it. See EDMUND WILSON, PATRIOTIC GORE: STUDIES IN THE LITERATURE OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 106-08 (1962)
(arguing that Lincoln envisioned himself as the individual who threatened the constitutional order). In particular, Lincoln psychobiographers have argued that the speech offers
a key to understanding the former President. See DWIGHT G. ANDERSON, ABRAHAM LINCOLN; THE QUEST FOR IMMORTALITY 68-78 (1982); GEORGE B. FORGIE, PATRICIDE IN THE
HOUSE DIVIDED: A PSYCHOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF LINCOLN AND HIS AGE 83-86, 249-70
(1979); CHARLES B. STROZIER, LINCOLN'S QUEST FOR UNION: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MEANINGS

61 (1982). Garry Wills has recently criticized the psychobiographers' argument that the
speech reflects "hostility to 'the fathers.'" GARY WILLS, LINCOLN AT GETTYSBURG: THE
WORDS THAT REMADE AMERICA 79 (1992). My claim here, however, is not that Lincoln was
hostile to the Founders. Rather, it is that he envied the fame they had achieved and hoped
to achieve a similar immortality. My interpretation accords with, and was influenced by,
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Moreover, it is not simply that the presidency attracts those interested in establishing an important historical reputation. Instead, once
attained, the presidency-and all of its trappings-strengthen its occupants' concern for their place in history. As scholar Forrest McDonald observed:
[W] hat presidents do in office, or try to do, is powerfully influenced
by a unique conception of history. The president lives in a museum
of the history of the presidency. When walking along the halls of
the White House, the president is constantly reminded that Jefferson walked the same halls as he waited for news of negotiations with
Napoleon, that Lincoln walked them when waiting for news of Antietam. When dining, the president never entirely escapes the realization that he is using the same silver that Madison and both
Roosevelts used. The president understands that he is a member of
a mystical fraternity, representing an unbroken chain of history and
mythology, and knows that far into the.future presidents will be
aware that he was a link in that chain, and cannot avoid wondering
what his place will be in their memory and in the nation's
memory.400
The topic of how Presidents confront, and try to surpass, the legacy of their predecessors is an understudied one. William
Leuchtenberg, the author of In the Shadow ofFDR, 401 observed in 1983
that no previous book or article had focused on "the influence of a
head of state on those who succeeded him."40 2 Leuchtenberg's study
suggests how powerfully a predecessor's legacy can haunt Presidents.
Leuchtenberg wrote:
[T]he men who succeeded him [FDR] found one question inescapable: How did they measure up to FDR? They were expected to
tread in the rows that he had furrowed, even, like those who sought
a sign of grace from a Chinese emperor, to exhibit the quality of
hsiao, of filial piety. Little wonder that they sometimes felt much
like the Athenian who voted to exile Aristides because he had wea403
ried of hearing him called "the Just.

Professor David Donald's reading of the speech. According to Donald, Lincoln's speech
reflected "his thirst for distinction," and it accorded with statements that he had made
privately to his close friendJoshua Speed. See DONALD, supranote 395, at 81. "To this one
intimate friend," Donald writes, "Lincoln confessed his ambition 'to link his name with
something that would redound to the interest of his fellow man,' and in his darker moods
he lamented 'that he had done nothing to make any human being remember that he had
lived.'" Id. (quoting Letter from Joshua Speed to William H. Herndon, Feb. 1866). For
further discussion of the speech, see William Michael Treanor, Learningfrom Lincoln, 65
FORDHAM L. REV. (forthcoming 1997).
400 FoRREsT MCDONALD, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 466-67 (1994).
401 WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, IN THE SHADOW OF FDRP FROM HARRY TRUMAN TO RONALD REAGAN (rev. ed. 1989).
402
403

Id. at 265. The first edition of Leuchtenburg's book was published in 1983.
Id. at xi.
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There is also evidence that suggests that Presidents are well aware of
the link between leading a nation to military triumph and historical
immortality and, conversely, of the link between military disaster and
infamy. The fear of the reputational consequences of military disaster
is evidenced by what White House Butler Alonzo Fields reports was
FDR's reaction to first hearing the news of Pearl Harbor. According
to Fields, he put his head in his hands and said, "My God,. my God,
how did it happen? How did it happen? Now I'll go down in history
disgraced. ' 40 4 Lyndon Johnson's explanation for why he would not
end the war in Vietnam manifests a similar fear. He declared, "I will
'40 5
not be the first President to lose a war.
On the other hand, perhaps because of his heightened sensitivity
to the desire for fame, Lincoln saw in Polk's support for war with Mexico a desire for "military glory-that attractive rainbow, that rises in
showers of blood-that serpent's eye, that charms to destroy. '40 6 Numerous individuals have suggested similar links between modem presidents' desire for glory or concern with their place in history and warlike foreign policy. Historian Alan Brinkley has observed of Theodore
Roosevelt:
Theodore Roosevelt complained frequently that his times had denied him the greatness to which he aspired and of which he considered himself capable. "A man has to take advantage of his
opportunities," he said in 1910 after leaving office, "but the opportunities have to come. If there is not the war, you don't get the
great general; if there is not the great occasion, you don't get the
great statesman; if Lincoln had lived in times of peace, no one
would know his name now." The great disappointment of
Roosevelt's life was that World War I came after he had left office,

that, as he saw it, Woodrow Wilson and not he had the real opportunity for greatness.

40 7

The previously quoted excerpt from biographer Richard Reeves's
book on John Kennedy suggests that Kennedy recognized Churchill's
commanding place in history and wanted to win a parallel place for
404 Interview with Alonzo Fields, White House Butler, American Experience: FDR (PBS
television broadcast, Oct. 12, 1994) (Journal Graphics Transcripts #702, on file with author). It should be noted that other accounts of Roosevelt's reaction to the bombing of
Pearl Harbor are different. For example, relying on Sumner Welles's and Eleanor
Roosevelt's statements, historian Doris Kearns Goodwin describes Roosevelt's "imperturbable demeanor." DoRis KEARNS GOODWIN, No ORINARY TIME: FRANKLIN AND ELEANOR
RoosEvELr THE HOME FRONT IN WORLD WAR II 289 (1994).
405 James Reston, Private Behavior, Public Responsibility, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 1987, at
A27.
406 Abraham Lincoln, Speech in United States House of Representatives: The War
with Mexico (Jan. 12, 1848), in 1 THE COLLECrED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note

396, at 439. For an analysis of this passage, see DONALD, supra note 395, at 124.
407

Alan Brinkley, The 43% Preuiden4 N.Y. TIMs, July 4, 1993, § 6, at 22.
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himself through the struggle with communism. 40 8 In describing the
path to Vietnam, historian and Johnson presidential aide Eric
Goldman wrote:
Intertwined with all aspects of his foreign policy was the President's
ambition. Much as Uohnson] wished that international affairs
could be de-emphasized, he was too seasoned a political leader not
to know that they were certain to play an important part in the overall judgment of his Administration. He was determined that when
he did have to deal with them, he would do so with effectiveness
and splash. Lyndon Johnson was going to be a great President, a
40 9
very great President, in all ways.
Leuchtenburg's account draws upon and parallels Goldman's account. Johnson, he writes:
was not satisfied to go down in the history books merely as a successful president in the Roosevelt tradition. He aimed instead to be
"the greatest of them all, the whlole bunch of them." And to be the
greatest president in history, he needed not just to match
10
4
Roosevelt's performance but to surpass it.

According to Leuchtenburg, this determination drove Johnson to
Vietnam and to disaster: "In his determination to outdo Roosevelt,
[Johnson] carried everything to excess-the overladen apparatus of
the Great Society; the insistence on having both guns and butter,
which had calamitous inflationary repercussions; and, most of all, the
body counts and the napalm and the saturation bombing."4 1' Doris
Kearns Goodwin puts the matter succinctly:
Lyndon Johnson had wanted to surpass Franklin Roosevelt; and
Roosevelt, after all, had not only won the reforms Johnson envied,
he had also waged a war. But there was a critical difference:
Roosevelt did not attempt the New Deal and World War II at the
same time. OnlyJohnson among the Presidents sought to be simultaneously first in peace and first in war; and even Johnson was
4 12
bound to fail.
The 1970 Senate Foreign Relations Committee report calling for
the repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution also reflected the view
413
that concern for their place in history led Presidents to favor war.
408
See REEVEs, supranote 395, at 278. See also MICHAEL S. SHERRY, IN THE SHADOW OF
WAR, THE UNITED STATES SINCE THE 1930s, at 244 (1995) (asserting that Kennedy hoped

his presidency would witness a "climax" to history "yield[ing] winners and losers."); supra
text accompanying note 395.
409
ERIC F. GoLDMAN, THE TRAGEDY OF LYNDON JOHNSON 384 (1969).
410
LEUCHTENBURG, supranote 401, at 142 (quoting Goldman, supra note 409, at 20).
411
Id. at 160.
412 DORIS KEARNS, LYNDONJOHNSON AND THE AMERICAN DREAM 285 (1976).
413
See COMMrrTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, TERMINATION OF MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA RESOLUTIONS, S. REP. No. 91-834, at 6-8 (1970).
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As background for its recommendation, the Committee analyzed the
rise of presidential power in the war powers area in the years following
the Second World War. It offered one explanation for why Presidents
had led the nation into war without securing congressional approval.
That explanation was the Presidents' desire for greatness-" [the] notion that great Presidents are those who act effectively to strengthen
the office of the Presidency as distinguished from strengthening the
4 14
constitutional system as a whole."
Richard Nixon's writings and his personal statements reveal that
he considered military triumphs and, more generally, foreign policy
triumphs, as the key to greatness. War was, for Nixon, the truest crucible. He. wrote: "It is a tragic reality that war, the most destructive
activity of man, also calls forth his highest nature and greatest qualities. '41 5 According to Nixon, through "[h]is brilliant leadership in
World War II,"416 Winston Churchill had become the greatest leader
of the modem era. Churchill was "'a mythical hero who belongs to
legend as much as to reality, the largest human being of our time.' "417
More prosaically, Nixon told his aide Monica Crowley shortly before
he died that President Clinton should focus on foreign affairs because
"'history will not remember him for anything he does domestically.
The economy will recover; it's all short-term and, let's face it, very
boring.'"418
William Crowe, chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, suggested that
President Bush's concern with his place in history was part of the reason why he initiated the Gulf War: "'[T] o be a great president you
have to have a war. All the great presidents have had their wars."' '4 19
Even more recently, it has been suggested that regard for "his place in
history" influenced President Clinton to be militarily aggressive in
Bosnia. 420
414 Id. at 8. The Committee called on future Presidents to embrace, instead, the view
of presidential greatness offered by the historian Thomas Bailey in his book Presidential
Greatnes.
"The bare fact that a President was a strong one, or a domineering one,

does not necessarily mean that he was a great one or even a good one. The
crucial questions arise: Was he strong in the right direction? Was he a dig-

nified, fair, constitutional ruler, serving the ends of democracy in a democratic and ethical manner?"
Id. (quoting THOMAS A. BAILEv, PRESIDENTIAL GREATN'ESS 227 (1966)).
415

RICHARD NIXON, IN THE ARENA: A MEMOIR OF VICTORY, DEFEAT AND RENEWAL

352

(1990).
416

Id. at 27.

417
418

Id. (quoting with approval Isaiah Berlin).
Christopher Buckley, FinalJudgments,N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1996, § 7, at 5 (reviewing

MONICA CROWLEY, NIXON OFF THE RECORD (1996) (quoting Nixon statement recorded in
Crowley book)).
419 BOB WOODWARD, THE COMMANDERS 6 (1991) (quoting William Crane).
420 See R.W. Apple, Jr., Why the Choice of '96 Will Remain a Bafflemen N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
18, 1996, § 4, at 1. It should be noted that, just as Presidents are concerned with their
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If Presidents equate military victories with historical greatness,
they are correct-or, at least, their views are in accord with what historians regard as greatness. Admiral Crowe's observation about great
Presidents is remarkably accurate. Washington, Lincoln, and Franklin
Roosevelt-the trio that historians have consistently rated as our three
greatest presidents 42 1-each led the nation to victory in war, Lincoln
and Roosevelt as Presidents, and Washington as Commander in Chief
at a time when there was no President. The link between fame and
war is not limited to this group. Of the four Presidents who are typically ranked next on the lists of presidential greatness-Jefferson,
Theodore Roosevelt, Wilson, and Truman-two led the nation in a
major war, Wilson during World War I, and Truman during World
4 22
War II and the Korean War.
In the most detailed study on the topic of why historians view
particular Presidents as great, Dean Keith Simonton used a regression
analysis to examine the various presidential rankings compiled by historians. 42 3 He explored how over 200 variables-including factors
such as number of bills signed, number of bills vetoed, percentage of
place in history, so too have they been concerned with learning the lessons of history,
although they have not always drawn the lessons scholars might think appropriate. In
much of the post-World War ii era, Presidents have concluded that the lesson to be drawn
from history was the need for toughness in dealing with foreign nations. See ERNEST R.
MAY, "LESSONS" OF THE PAST: THE USE AND MISUSE OF HISTORY INAMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

10, 57, 113-14 (1973). In the wake of the Vietnam War, the lessons of past wars have been
understood differently by different Presidents. Compare SHERRY, supra note 408, at 344-45
(asserting that Carter opposed militarization in part because of nation's experience in Vietnam), with id. at 392-93 (asserting that Reagan's "memories and experience of World War
II and the War" encouraged his support for militarization).
421 Arthur Schlesinger, Sr. conducted the first such poll of historians in 1948. See Arthur M. Schlesinger, What Makes a President Great?Or a Failure?The Verdict of History Provides
Some Answers, LIFE, Nov. 1, 1948, at 66 (ranking Lincoln, Washington, and Franklin D.
Roosevelt as the three greatest Presidents). Eight subsequent polls have similarly concluded that Lincoln, Washington, and Franklin D. Roosevelt were our three greatest Presidents. And each of the polls has ranked Lincoln the "greatest" of the three. See, e.g.,
Robert K. Murray & Tim H. Blessing, The PresidentialPeformance Study: A Progress Report, J.
AM. HIST. 535, 542 (1983) (ranking Lincoln, Washington, and Franklin D. Roosevelt as the
greatest Presidents); Steve Neal, Puttingthe Presidentsin TheirPlace: Longtime Favorites Top the
List, CH. SuN-TIMES, Nov. 19, 1995, at 30 (same); Arthur M. Schlesinger, OurPre.sidents: A
Ranking by 75 Historians,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1996, §6 (Magazine), at 12 (same); Arthur M.
Schlesinger, Jr., The Ultimate Approval Rating,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1996, § 6 (Magazine), at
46 (same). The ranking lists produced by these surveys, except for the two most recent,
are presented in Jack E. Holmes & Robert E. Elder, Jr., Our Best and Worst Presidents:Some
PossibleReasons for Perceived Performance 19 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 529 (1989).
422 On designation of this group, see DEAN KEIrrH SIMONTON, WHY PRESIDENTS SUCCEED: A POLTIaCAL PSYCHOLOGY OF LEADERSHIP 175-85 (1987) (presenting list and summarizing data). Theodore Roosevelt and Thomas Jefferson also have powerful associations
with war, Roosevelt as a war hero during the Spanish-American War, andJefferson as the
author of the Declaration of Independence and a leading Revolutionary War political
figure.
423 See Dean Keith Simonton, PresidentialGreatness: The Historical Consensus and Its Psychological Significance, 7 PoL. PSYCHOL. 259, 270-71 (1986).
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judicial nominees confirmed, and number of books published-corresponded with ranking.424 Other than years in office, the strongest
predictor of positive ranking was years at war during the presidency. 425 In other words, the more years in which the nation was at
war during his presidency, the higher the President's rating was likely
to be. Nothing any President did while in office had as great a positive
effect as leading the nation in war. Surveying the relevant data, a
range of other studies has also reached the conclusion that war years
correlate with presidential greatness, as historians judge greatness.

426

This evidence suggests that the insight underlying the Founders'
assignment of the power to start war to Congress, rather than the President, is at least as valid today as it was in 1787. Presidents' concern
with their place in history still makes them likely to lead the nation to
war. This explains, at least in part, why throughout the foreign affair
crises in our history, in all but one case, Presidents have been more
4 27
pro-war than Congress.
From the vantage point of constitutional law, the question becomes what effect should the continuing accuracy of the Framers' insight have. For an originalist of the translation school, the current
reality of the Framers' fear that Presidents are particularly likely to
lead the nation to war means that the concrete original understanding-that Congress alone should have the power to start war except in
cases where it is necessary to repel sudden attacks-must be given effect. In other words, no changed circumstance warrants a re-allocation of power between the Executive and Congress.
This insight about presidential self-interest is also relevant to current constitutional discourse because it indicates that courts should
not apply the political question doctrine to avoid resolving challenges
to the constitutionality of Executive-initiated uses of force. Whether
the political question doctrine currently exists at the Supreme Court
level is an open question, 428 but the United States District Court for
424
425
426

See id. at 269-71.
See id. at 273.
See, e.g., Holmes & Elder, supra note 421, at 544, 546; David C. Nice, The Influence of

War and Party System Aging on the Ranking of Presidents,37 W. POL. Q. 443 (1984); Hans W.
Wendt & Paul C. Light, Measuring "Greatness"in American Presidents: A Model Casefor International Research on PoliticalLeadership, 6 EUR. J. Soc. PsYcHOL. 105 (1976).
427 See Sidak, supra note 190, at 85-86. The one exception is President Grover Cleveland, who strongly and successfully opposed war with Spain in 1896. See id. at 86. Although

President Adams opposed declaring war against France, despite a faction in Congress that
wanted war, the clear majority of Congress opposed war-even among the Federalists. See
Boston Patriot,supranote 185, at 305 n.2. (noting that Federalist congressional caucus voted
against declaration of war).
428 The classic statement of the political question doctrine is found in Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186 (1962).
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is
found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
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the District of Columbia and the District of Columbia Circuit court
have both invoked the doctrine as the basis of decision in a series of
cases in which they have dismissed suits seeking to overturn presiden-

tial decisions to send troops into combat.429 Courts in these cases
have held that they would not resolve the constitutionality of presidential actions because Congress had not affirmatively sought to block
such actions. For example, in Lowry v. Reagan,4 0 Judge Revercomb
explained that he would not reach the merits of the case because
"[a]llthough styled as a dispute between the legislative and executive
branches of government, this lawsuit evidences and indeed is a byproduct of political disputes within Congress regarding the applicabil431
ity of the War Powers Resolution to the Persian Gulf situation."
The Court in Dellums v. Bush432 reached a similar result, although
it did not rely upon the political question doctrine. There, the district

court held that the political question doctrine did not bar a suit challenging the military build-up that preceded Operation Desert

Storm. 433 Nonetheless, the court dismissed the case for reasons of

ripeness which reflected concerns similar to those expressed in Lowry:
"[U] nless the Congress as a whole, or by a majority, is heard from, the

controversy here cannot be deemed ripe; it is only if the majority of
the Congress seeks relief from an infringement on its constitutional

war-declaration power that it may be entitled to receive it."4- 4 These
decisions reflect a view that Congress has adequate incentives and adequate tools to protect its power under the War Powers Clause and
that, if Congress does not act as a body, courts should not
intervene. 43 5
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution
without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one question.
Id. at 217. For the position that the doctrine is not followed at the Supreme Court level,
see ELY, supra note 8, at 55; Louis Henkin, Is There a "PoliticalQuestion" Doctrine, 85 YALE
LJ. 597 (1976).
429
See Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F.Supp.
333 (D.D.C. 1987); Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F.Supp. 893, (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd per cuiam,
720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
430
676 F. Supp. 333 (D.D.C. 1987).
431
Id. at 338.
432
752 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990).
433
See id. at 1145-46.
434 Id. at 1151.
435
See alSOJESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REiIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL. PROCESS: A
FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE

ROLE

OF THE SUPREME COURT

295-96 (1980) (argu-

ing that separation of powers disputes between the President and Congress should not be
addressed by courts since the injured branch can defend itself politically).
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The analysis in this Article indicates that this view is wrong. Presidents have a personal motive for starting wars. The Founders gave
Congress the power to decide when wars should start,- not because
Congress has some countervailing and superior motive, but because
Congress is, in contrast with the President, disinterested. The Founders believed that congressional representatives are too numerous to
reap glory from war and therefore will fairly evaluate national interests
in deciding whether to go to war. Moreover, Congress has no motive
to try to stop the President from initiating conflict (as the failure of
Congress to respond to presidential disregard of the War Powers Resolution illustrates).436 Thus, a requirement imposed under the political question doctrine that Congress exert itself before courts
intervene leads to a result inconsistent with the Founders' vision: the
President will assert authority that the Constitution has not given him
and Congress will, in general, fail to counter by asserting its prerogative. Congress will fail to assert its power under the War Powers
Clause for the same reason that it was given that power-disinterest.
This point leads back to the ultimate question: Did the Founders
get it right? If Congress is disinterested, and the Executive, concerned with his place in history, has a motive to bring the nation to
war, who should make the decision? For the originalist-either a
traditional originalist or a translation originalist-the question has
been answered by the Founders. But for someone who views the original understanding as not controlling, the question is more difficult.
As noted, pro-Executive scholars have offered a range of nonoriginalist reasons why the President should have the power to lead
the nation into war. 437 In contrast, pro-Congress scholars have not
fully fought the battle on these terms. Although they have urged that
it is wise to require congressional sanction for combat, they have generally placed primary reliance on Framers' intent. 438 This Article has

offered a new rationale justifying the pro-Congress position: that the
President's desire for a place in history creates a bias in favor of war.
Self-interest in fame improperly skews decisionmaking.
The point can be put even more broadly. Although the Framers'
principal concern may have been the influence of the desire for glory,
that concern can be generalized and re-framed as a concern that the
President's self-interest creates a bias in favor of war. Although the
desire for glory is highlighted, Madison's Helvidius letters reflect
other factors that would influence a President to initiate war out of
self-interest-"ambition, avarice, vanity."439 In current politics, the
436
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See supra text accompanying notes 65-68.
See supra text accompanying notes 91-94.
See supra text accompanying notes 95-103.
Madison, "Helvidius"Number 4, supra note 35, at 108.
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principal concern along these lines is that a President will recklessly
bring the nation to war in order to win re-election. 4 40 Although this
concern may not have specifically worried the Framers, it has a long
heritage, as some of the criticisms of the War of 1812 quoted above
indicate. 44 1 It is reasonable, therefore, to suspect that Presidents are
inclined to favor war, and accordingly to withhold from them the
power to lead the nation to war.
Not everyone will find this new argument for giving Congress
alone the power to initiate conflict compelling. The counter to this
argument is as follows: just because Presidents may have personal reasons to lead the nation to war does not mean that power should be
withheld from them. It can be argued that Congress, in the absence
of a personal motivation to go to war, favors war too rarely. A proponent of this view might point, for example, to World War II and the
Gulf War. In both instances, Congress was deeply divided whereas the
President strongly favored war. Perhaps, in both instances, the President was right. Perhaps because war is so terrible, those who have no
reason to favor it are too risk-averse. Our constitutional system is in
large part based on the notion that self-interest can be harnessed for
the national interest; this is but another example of how appropriate
that approach is. In this regard, it is worth noting that Adair was
urging that modern presidents concern themselves with fame, not
warning us against such a concern. 442 The argument would then run
that, because Presidents seek to be remembered well by history, they
are precisely the individuals who should be making the decision about
whether the nation goes to war.
Thus, for a nonoriginalist, this Article will not end the debate
over who should have the power to start war. It will, however, bring a
new concern and a new focus to that debate.
CONCLUSION

The extensive scholarly debate about the original understanding
of the War Powers Clause thus far has been inconclusive. Previous
440 See, e.g., ELY, supra note 8, at 8, 146 n.41 (noting fears in 1992 "that the executive
might start a war to demonstrate toughness and 'leadership' in perilous political times");
Bobbitt, supra note 15, at 1383 (noting existence of belief that President Bush was motivated by electoral concerns to start a war, although dismissing that belief as an "old canard"); Dennis Duggan, Church's CandleFlickers as Does the HopeforPeace, NEWSDAY, Jan. 10,
1991, at 6 (claiming that Presidents Bush, Reagan, Nixon, andJohnson sought "the kind of
war that gets a President re-elected"); Elizabeth Neuffer, Allies Assess the Possible Fallout,
BOSTON Gi.OBE, Sept. 6, 1995, at 11 ("[P]resident Clinton faces a tough re-election campaign-and... it is important to his image to be seen as forceful in Bosnia."); William
Safire, Comeback Coming, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1992, at A25 (suggesting that a prominent

dictator "is going to get zapped" in order to aid Bush re-election campaign).
441
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See supra Part III.D.
See ADAIR, supra note 32, at 26.
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writings in favor of the position that the Founders intended to give
Congress alone the power to initiate conflict have suffered from a critical weakness: They have failed to offer a convincing explanation for
why the Founders would have given that power to Congress when so
many factors, including precedent and practical considerations,
weighed in favor of giving the war-starting power to the President.
This Article has advanced such an explanation: The Founders gave
Congress the power to start war because they believed that Presidents,
out of a desire for personal glory, would be too prone to war. This
Article thus dramatically strengthens the originalist case for a proCongress reading of the Clause.
This Article is also significant in that it presents evidence that the
Founders did not intend to give the President veto power over declarations of war. Although the argument that the President lacks this
power has previously been made on textualist grounds, it has not been
made on originalist grounds. Indeed, where the possibility that the
Founders did not intend to give the President this power has been
raised, it has been rapidly dismissed. Substantial evidence indicates,
however, that most of the Founders thought that the decision to go to
war was exclusively vested in Congress, and this Article, by highlighting
the Founders' distrust of the President's decisionmaking in this area,
has made this position comprehensible.
The argument presented here also has an important bearing on
nonoriginalist debate about the proper meaning of the War Powers
Clause. Because of their intellectual heritage, and because of the
great glory that Washington achieved during the Revolutionary War,
the Founders were particularly sensitive to the possibility that Presidents, motivated by a desire to secure an important place in history,
would lead the nation to war. Modem scholars, in debating the meaning of the War Powers Clause, have lost sight of this concern. But
strong evidence shows that this concern remains at least as relevant as
it was two-hundred years ago. That is, modern presidents still tend to
favor war because of their desire to be judged well by history. Recognition of this point indicates that courts err when they invoke the
political question doctrine in order to avoid resolving challenges to
presidential actions committing troops to combat. More basically, it
provides a powerful argument for why Presidents should not have the
power to bring the nation to war. Although it is not an argument that
everyone will find convincing, it is an argument that forces us to reexamine a fear that animated the Founders, and which we have lost
sight of over time. Yet it is a concern that continues to bear directly
on the actions of those who occupy the most powerful office the Founders created. Even if we do not embrace the Founders' conclusions,
we should admire their prescience.

